By Steve Dubb and Emily Kawano

Nonprofit Quarterly
July 13, 2022 – What does ownership mean, and how can it be structured to design a more democratic economy? It is common to think of ownership as being about possession: it’s yours, or it’s mine—or perhaps, if we are thinking as a group, it’s ours. But it is much more than that. Ownership is a bundle of rights—social, individual, and collective—which means its boundaries and intersections vary from place to place.1

Today, a growing number of people are questioning how those ownership rights are defined and distributed. These days, in the world of work in the United States, there is talk of a Great Resignation;2 but this can also be thought of in other ways—as a great awakening, a great rebellion, a great recalibration.3 Beyond the workplace, communities are designing entirely new ecosystems of institutions—reclaiming ownership of their identities, cultures, land, and businesses.

Discussion of systems change has also rarely been more present. Yet, when people say “systems change,” more often than not they don’t mean systemic change—not really. Perhaps, to be generous, they mean systemic change writ small, focused on taking a multifaceted (sometimes called “collective impact”) approach to addressing a single problem—such as building a better workforce training and development system4— rather than shifting power and changing rights of ownership in society as a whole.

As Cyndi Suarez, NPQ’s president and editor in chief, observed a few years ago, “[S]ystem thinking has become deracinated, devoid of its true power implications.”5 Nowhere is this point more apt than when it comes to thinking of the overall economy. Simply put, when it comes to the economy, all too often systems change is treated as a bridge too far, best not entertained at all. Alternatively, systems change is only framed within the confines of our current dominant system: we are invited to “reimagine capitalism” rather than to dare imagine beyond it.6

With this article, we want to take that challenge on. We do this not out of curiosity or academic fancy but for some highly practical and pragmatic reasons. Our collective well-being—and perhaps even our collective survival—depends on it.

The Nature of the Challenge

It is common to treat the present global economy as a fact of nature, but it is not. Greed, we are also told, is part of the human condition. Maybe it is, but so too is cooperation. As Ariel Knafo, a psychology professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, explained in Scientific American years ago, “Human nature supports both prosocial and selfish traits,” and the “degree to which we act cooperatively or selfishly is unique to each individual and hinges on a variety of genetic and environmental influences.”7 Our current economic system privileges greed and diminishes cooperation; an economic system that prioritized solidarity would do the opposite. We can design our economy to build on the more cooperative, rather than the more self-serving, parts of our human selves—if we choose.

Can a redesign be done? Well, it has been done before. In fact, our present capitalist system, so often treated as permanent, is, historically speaking, quite new. The origins of the capitalist economy can be traced back to at least the beginning of the imperialist process unleashed by the European so-called “discovery” of the Americas. As economist Jeffrey Sachs explains in “Twentieth-century political economy: a brief history of global capitalism,” modern capitalism only “emerged as a [dominant] social system in western Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century.”8

In short, capitalism became the world’s reigning economic system only two centuries ago, and in many parts of the world its ascendancy is more recent than that. Economic systems have changed before. They can—and almost certainly will—change again.

Capitalism, as an economic system, has unleashed human productive capacity, but it has done so in ways that are highly exploitative and extractive. Capitalism, in short, has done and is doing great harm. It is impossible to discuss capitalism without recognizing its roots in Indigenous genocide and the enslavement of millions of Africans and their forcible relocation—dragged in chains to the “New World.” As Joseph Inikori, a University of Rochester historian, details, “the employment of enslaved Africans in large-scale commodity production in the Americas was central to the rise of the nineteenth-century Atlantic economy.”9

These days, even the benefits of capitalism on its own terms (such as gross domestic product) are showing diminishing returns—one sign of which is a decline in productivity increases.10 Meanwhile, when it comes to economic justice, the costs are disturbingly obvious. In January 2022, Oxfam offered a report that noted, “The 10 richest men in the world own more than the bottom 3.1 billion people.”11 And U.S. data on the racial wealth and wage gaps give few indications—to be polite—of substantive progress. In 2020, David Leonhardt in the New York Times observed that “the wages of Black men trail those of white men by as much as when Harry Truman was president.”12 Meanwhile, the Black-white wealth gap, according to Federal Reserve data, was greater in 2016 than in 1968 (2019 data showed modest improvement).13

Environmental costs are also rapidly rising. The climate crisis, the result of mounting carbon emissions, has already increased global temperatures by an estimated 1.11 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels.14 But carbon emissions are by no means the only environmental challenge. As journalist Ashoka Mukpo writes in Mongabay, “The past 50 years have seen a catastrophic decline in the planet’s ecosystems and natural environments. Every day at least 32,300 hectares (80,000 acres) of forest vanish, and the size of wildlife populations has dropped by an average of 60%.”15

A Path Forward: Steps Toward a Solidarity Economy

How can any economy address the vast injustices ours generates today? The word economy is a combination of two Greek words—oikos, meaning household, and nomos, meaning management.16 The global economy, then, requires that we collectively manage our planetary home, including how we generate wealth and allocate resources. This is, of course, an immensely complicated endeavor in a world inhabited by more than 7.9 billion people.17

Still, the good news is that the economy is ultimately a human creation. It therefore can be—and is now, albeit often in very harmful ways—collectively managed. Even better news is that there is widespread creativity and innovation building a new economy right now in the shell of the old. In some cases, people are doing so consciously—in other words, in their work, they are pursuing a vision of replacing the overall economic system with one that would prioritize solidarity. More often, though, these innovators are claiming ownership of their community and their local economies without explicitly seeking to build a solidarity economy. But in this pragmatic, practical, problem-solving work, these economy-building movement leaders are laying crucial building blocks of a different, more humane form of economic and social organization.

But what do we mean by the phrase solidarity economy? As was noted last year in the Nonprofit Quarterly, when moving toward an economy that is rooted in principles of solidarity, there is neither a “ready-made” formula nor a “one-size-fits-all” approach. A solidarity economy is, however, organized around some core values—solidarity, participatory democracy, equity in all dimensions, sustainability, and pluralism.18 In terms of its theoretical base, the solidarity economy builds on the notion of economic democracy—namely, the idea that principles of popular sovereignty should be applied to management of the economy.19

The notion of a solidarity economy is also based on lessons from the failures of twentieth-century state socialism. The core solidarity economy values of pluralism, participatory democracy, and sustainability are a direct response to the lessons learned from state socialism’s overreliance on centralized decision-making, as is the solidarity economy movement’s overall emphasis on the importance of decentralization and federation.

A mistaken assumption of state socialism was its implicit postulate that economic management of our collective home meant management from the top. The work of the late Elinor Ostrom, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009, points to the fallacy of this assumption. Her Nobel Prize lecture is titled “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems.” Ostrom’s research focused on the organization of what she called “common pool resources.” To pick a prominent example, the free-for-all dumping of carbon into the air could be considered a degradation of the common pool resource of our global atmosphere, resulting in climate change. Among her conclusions: more often than not, effective resource management solutions come from the bottom rather than the top. Ostrom also argued that “a core goal of public policy should be to facilitate the development of institutions that bring out the best in humans.”20 This also happens to be a good way to summarize a central goal of the solidarity economy movement.

Putting Solidarity Economy Values Into Practice

So, what practical, pragmatic lessons can be learned from economic justice movements today? Here are a few:

Mutual Aid. The COVID-19 pandemic has lifted mutual aid out of obscurity and made evident to all the practicality of solidarity as an operating principle. An article published last year in Frontiers in Psychology noted the fundamental role that mutual aid played in promoting community health and well-being during the pandemic in the United Kingdom. It called for sustaining such practices even after the pandemic finally subsides, by (among other things) prioritizing community-level interventions, and recognizing their importance in public policy in developing “long-term community responses.”21

Democratic Planning. Participatory democracy is sometimes described as a pie-in-the-sky concept; but participatory budgeting in the United States is, increasingly, shifting from a niche idea to a serious mechanism for the public to take ownership of public resources and plan their use in a democratic way.22

Take the city of Seattle, Washington. In response to calls to defund the police, the city council allocated

$30 million to be distributed through a public planning process. The process was sometimes contentious, but it succeeded in giving BIPOC communities in Seattle an opportunity to self-determine the investments that they needed. As city council member Debora Juarez said, when the council geared up to approve the measure, “We don’t need to tell BIPOC communities what they need. We just need to listen and deliver.”23

Figure 1: Seattle, $30 million Participatory Budgeting
(as adopted by City Council on August 9, 2021)26

Housing: $8.8 million
•  $4.6 million: Subsidized homeownership projects, with target outreach to households of color

•  $1.8 million: Wealth-building education for residents, artists, and business owners of color

•  $1 million: City contracting help for construction businesses owned by women and people of color

•  $875,000: Help for homeowners to keep their properties

•  $250,000: Study on potential lease-to-own program

•  $250,000: Consultant work on housing for union apprentices

Small businesses: $7.5 million

•  $5 million: Grants and subsidized loans to small businesses, including those owned by people of color

•  $2.5 million: Consultant support for small businesses

Education: $7.5 million

•  $4 million: Various student and teacher programs, with focus on youth of color

•  $2 million: Cultural programs aimed at youth of color

•  $1.5 million: Programs for youth involved in the criminal legal system

Health: $6.2 million

•  $1.7 million: Programs helping residents of color with healthcare careers

•  $1.5 million: Innovative healing programs at community health centers

•  $1 million: Efforts to secure healthcare for residents without coverage, with focus on communities of color

•  $750,000: Healthy food programs aimed at communities of color

•  $550,000: Environmental justice grants for community organizations that focus on people of color

•  $500,000: Healthcare mentorships and internships for youth of color

•  $250,000: Farm-to-table programs aimed at youth of color

Political economist Gar Alperovitz has noted that the issue of democratic planning is a central challenge for building a post-capitalist economy.24 There is, quite obviously, a lot more work to do to build governance structures that can allow for effective democratic input into economic planning at the regional and national level. Nonetheless, nascent though they may be, local examples of democratic planning, such as in Seattle, are building a critical knowledge base in this direction.25

Workplace Democracy. Employees typically spend around half of their waking hours at their workplace. All too often, they are excluded from any democratic decision-making beyond what’s for lunch. The transformative potential of fostering workplace democracy is enormous, and data suggest that it pays off in terms of productivity, job quality, job satisfaction, and employee retention. Employee ownership is a hot trend these days, especially given the so-called “silver tsunami”—the impending retirement of the baby boom generation of small business owners.27 There are two major avenues of employee ownership: an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and a worker cooperative. Both have been shown to improve business performance.

ESOPs give workers shares of stock in their workplace, and are by far the more widespread model. While workers in some ESOPs have a controlling interest, the vast majority do not. Worker cooperatives, by contrast, are owned and controlled by the workers, thus hardwiring workplace democracy into the structure. While ESOPs are a step in the right direction, worker co-ops are a better strategy to build democracy in the workplace.

Sustainability. At the Midwest Organic and Sustainable Education Service (MOSES), executive director Lori Stern sees regenerative agriculture as a means to apply solidarity economy principles to build “a more equitable and resilient system that puts farmers, workers, and eaters in control.” Her organization pursues this vision through a range of strategies, including increasing connections between farmers (including by building domestic supply chains), promoting cooperative ownership structures, and food system policy advocacy. Stern adds that, “The emerging farming solidarity economy is a sum of a range of practices, rooted in solidarity economy principles of pluralism, democracy, equity, mutualism, and sustainability. The connected and circular nature of life on a diverse farm forms the ecosystem that enables all to thrive.”28

Equity and Reparations. There are many inspiring examples of how a genuine solidarity economy, organizing effectively, combines equity and community ownership. One example comes from Humboldt, California, where Cooperation Humboldt—an organization with an explicit solidarity economy mission—has partnered with the local Wiyot nation. This partnership has involved committing to paying an honor tax of 1 percent of Cooperation Humboldt’s annual budget to the Wiyot nation, in acknowledgment that Humboldt is unceded Wiyot ancestral territory. Such reparations are integral to a solidarity economy.29

But Is Systemic Change Possible?

We conclude where we began. We respect those, such as Chris Benner and Manuel Pastor, who advocate for the broad application of solidarity principles in our economy but seek to do so within the framework of the existing economic system.30 Benner and Pastor note that “we have reached a point where our fundamental economic structures are driving unprecedented inequality, social divisions, and ecological destruction, amidst a politics of polarization, fragmentation, and alienation,” and ask if we cannot “build a better economy” out of a sense of mutuality.31 That is, indeed, the right question to ask.

Where we differ is in our contention that advocates of a solidarity economy must be brave enough to admit that building an alternative economics that is truly based on cooperation will very likely require systemic change beyond capitalism.32 In particular, we believe the separation of the overwhelming majority of people from meaningful ownership of the economy is a central flaw of capitalism that fosters division, creates concentration of wealth and power, encourages corruption (and cheating—anything to get an edge), and, ultimately, undermines solidarity. This is not to deny the need to fight for reforms; however, it is also to affirm the need for movements to retain the imagination to envision systemic transformation, even while fighting for reforms such as the ones obtained by solidarity economy advocates in Seattle.

Where we agree with Benner and Pastor is in the necessity of rooting social change in social movements. The struggle for a solidarity economy is a practical one, and there is no path forward without social movement. As the late sociologist Erik Olin Wright noted, “If processes of social reproduction were comprehensive, and fully coherent, then there would be little possibility for effective strategies of radical social transformation.”33 But Wright was an optimist, and he added that “even when the spaces are limited, they can allow for transformations that matter.”34

That remains the work. It begins with imagining an economy beyond capitalism. Is this possible? Not only is it possible, it’s a must, if we truly want to work toward an economy that we can all claim as our own.

Notes
1. Steve Dubb, “Ownership as Social Relation: Nonprofit Strategies to Build Community Wealth through Land,” Nonprofit Quarterly, December 11, 2018, org/ownership-as-social-relation-nonprofit-strategies-to-build-community-wealth-through-land.

2. Ophelia Akanjo, “The Great Resignation—A Call for Change in Organizational Culture,” Nonprofit Quarterly, February 16, 2022, org/the-great-resignation-a-call-for-change-in-organizational-culture.

3. Manuel Pastor et , “Solidarity Economics: OUR Movement, OUR Economy” (UC Santa Cruz Institute for Social Transformation and USC Dornsife Equity Research Institute, November 4, 2021, virtual), transform.ucsc.edu/event/solidarity-economics/.

4. Bryan Lindsley, “Our Change Systems Solutions—FAQs,” National Fund for Workforce Solutions, Washington, C., accessed April 2, 2022, nationalfund.org/our-solutions/change-systems-for-improved-outcomes/frequently-asked-questions-about-our-change-systems-solution.

5. Cyndi Suarez, “Systems Change Is All about Shifting Power,” Nonprofit Quarterly, October 1, 2019, org/systems-change-is-all-about-shifting-power.

6. See, for example, Our Call to Reimagine Capitalism in America (Redwood City, CA: Omidyar Network, September 2020); and Rebecca Henderson, Reimagining Capitalism in a World on Fire (New York: PublicAffairs, 2020). See also Rebecca Henderson, website for Reimagining Capitalism in a World on Fire, accessed May 2, 2022, org.

7. Matthew Robison, “Are People Naturally Inclined to Cooperate or Be Selfish?” Scientific American, September 1, 2014, scientificamerican.com/article/are-people-naturally-inclined-to-cooperate-or-be-selfish.

8. Jeffrey Sachs, “Twentieth-century political economy: a brief history of global capitalism,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15, no. 4 (December 1999): 92.

9. Joseph Inikori, “Atlantic Slavery and the Rise of the Capitalist Global Economy.” Supplement, Current Anthropology 61, no. S22 (October 2020): S166–67.

10. Shawn Sprague, “The S. productivity slowdown: an economy-wide and industry-level analysis,” Monthly Labor Review, April 2021, www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2021/article/the-us-productivity-slowdown-the-economy-wide-and-industry-level-analysis.htm.

11. Nabil Ahmed et , Inequality kills: The unparalleled action needed to combat unprecedented inequality in the wake of COVID-19 (Oxford, UK: Oxfam Great Britain, January 17, 2022), 10.
12. David Leonhardt, “The Black-White Wage Gap Is as Big as It Was in 1950,” New York Times, June 25, 2020, com/2020/06/25/opinion/sunday/race-wage-gap.html.

13. Heather Long and Andrew Van Dam, “The black-white economic divide is as wide as it was in 1968,” Washington Post, June 4, 2020, washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/04/economic-divide-black-households; and Rachel Siegel, “Wealth gaps between Black and White families persisted even at the height of the economic expansion,” Washington Post, September 28, 2020, washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/28/wealth-gap-fed.

14. World Meteorological Organization, “2021 one of the seven warmest years on record, WMO consolidated data shows,” press release 19012022, January 19, 2022, public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/2021-one-of-seven-warmest-years-record-wmo-consolidated-data-shows.

15, Ashoka Mukpo, “As nature declines, so does human quality of life, study finds,” Mongabay, February 9, 2021, mongabay.com/2021/02/as-nature-declines-so-does-human-quality-of-life-study-finds.

16. “The Oikos of God: Economy and Ecology in the Global Household,” Interfaith Center for Sustainable Development, accessed May 3, 2022, com/the-oikos-of-god-economy-and-ecology-in-the-global-household.

17. “Wold Population Dashboard,” United Nations Population Fund, 2022, accessed May 3, 2022, org/data/world-population-dashboard.

18. Emily Kawano, “Imaginal Cells of the Solidarity Economy,” Nonprofit Quarterly 28, 2 (Summer 2021): 48–55, nonprofitquarterly.org/imaginal-cells-of-the-solidarity-economy/.

19, Ted Howard, Steve Dubb, and Sarah McKinley, “Economic Democracy,” in Achieving Sustainability: Visions, Principles, and Practices, Debra Rowe (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2014), 231–39.

20. Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems” (Nobel Prize lecture, Aula Magna, Stockholm University, Stockholm, December 8, 2009), org/uploads/2018/06/ostrom_lecture.pdf.

21. Maria Fernandes-Jesus et , “More Than a COVID-19 Response: Sustaining Mutual Aid Groups During and Beyond the Pandemic,” Frontiers in Psychology 12 (October 20, 2021).

22. See Michael Menser, “From Defunding to Reinvestment: Why We Need to Scale Participatory Budgeting,” Nonprofit Quarterly, June 25, 2020, nonprofitquarterly.org/from-defunding-to-reinvestment-why-we-need-to-scale-participatory-budgeting.

23. Daniel Beekman, “Seattle will invest $30 million in strategies recommended by panel for communities of color,” Seattle Times, last modified August 10, 2021, com/seattle-news/politics/seattle-will-invest-30-million-in-strategies-recommended-by-panel-for-communities-of-color. See also Daniel Beekman, “Seattle Mayor Durkan sends proposal to City Council for $30 million promised to communities of color,” Seattle Times, last modified July 13, 2021, seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/seattle-mayor-durkan-sends-proposal-to-city-council-for-30-million-promised-to-communities-of-color/.

24. Gar Alperovitz,” Building a Democratic Economy: Sketch of a Pluralist Commonwealth,” Nonprofit Quarterly 27, 1 (Spring 2020): 50–57, nonprfitquarterly.org/building-a-democratic-economy-sketch-of-a-pluralist-commonwealth/.

25. Steve Dubb, “Seattle Launches $30 million Participatory Budgeting Process,” Nonprofit Quarterly, February 5, 2021, org/seattle-launches-30-million-participatory-budgeting-process/.

26. For these data, see Beekman, “Seattle Mayor Durkan sends proposal to City Council for $30 million promised to communities of color.”

27. Steve Dubb, “Can Employee Ownership Hold Back a Tsunami of Small Business Closures?” Nonprofit Quarterly, November 27, 2017, org/can-employee-ownership-hold-back-tsunami-small-business-closures.

28. Lori Stern, “Rethinking Food with Solidarity in Mind: Lessons from COVID-19,” Nonprofit Quarterly, October 20, 2021, org/rethinking-food-with-solidarity-in-mind-lessons-from-covid-19.

29. Michelle Vassel and David Cobb, “An Indigenous Community Land Trust Rises: Making Land Back a Reality,” Nonprofit Quarterly, October 13, 2021, org/an-indigenous-community-land-trust-rises-making-land-back-a-reality.

30. Chris Benner and Manuel Pastor, Solidarity Economics: Why Mutuality and Movements Matter (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2021), 2.

31. Ibid.

32, Emily Kawano and Julie Matthaei, “System Change: A Basic Primer to the Solidarity Economy,” Nonprofit Quarterly, July 8, 2020, org/system-change-a-basic-primer-to-the-solidarity-economy.

33. Erik Olin Wright, “Elements of a Theory of Transformation,” in Envisioning Real Utopias (London: Verso Books, 2010), 290.

34. Ibid.

Steve Dubb is a senior editor at NPQ, where he directs NPQ’s economic justice program, including NPQ’s Economy Remix column. Steve has worked with cooperatives and nonprofits for over two decades, including twelve years at The Democracy Collaborative and three years as executive director of NASCO (North American Students of Cooperation). In his work, Steve has authored, co-authored and edited numerous reports; participated in and facilitated learning cohorts; designed community building strategies; and helped build the field of community wealth building. Steve is the lead author of Building Wealth: The Asset-Based Approach to Solving Social and Economic Problems (Aspen 2005) and coauthor (with Rita Hodges) of The Road Half Traveled: University Engagement at a Crossroads, published by MSU Press in 2012. In 2016, Steve curated and authored Conversations on Community Wealth Building, a collection of interviews of community builders that Steve had conducted over the previous decade.

Emily Kawano is a cofounder of the US Solidarity Economic Network, codirector of Wellspring Cooperatives in Springfield, Massachusetts, and is a member of NPQ’s economic justice advisory committee.

October 2018:An exchange prompted by the essay 

The Precariat: Today’s Transformative Class? 

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Bill Fletcher
Taking a long view of precariousness as an inherent feature of capitalism can shed light on the contemporary debate on “the precariat.” Read

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Nancy Folbre
The focus on “the precariat” is useful but limited: the fight over distribution isn’t just between labor and capital. Read

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Azfar Khan
A universal basic income is key to delivering security and autonomy to people in a precarious world. Read

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Alexandra Köves
Beyond policies like a universal basic income, a transition to a equitable and sustainable society requires the redefinition of well-being, needs, and work itself. Read

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George Liodakis
There is no “precariat,” per se—the working class as-a-whole remains the necessary agent for transformation. Read

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Ronaldo Munck
Work in the Global South has always been precarious, but the resurgence of global labor organizing offers a way forward. Read

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William I. Robinson
The “precariat,” rather than a new class, is part of the global proletariat, on whose struggle with transnational capital our fate depends. Read

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Pritam Singh
A basic income alone is not transformative, but a feature of a broader ecosocialist vision of dismantling capitalism. Read

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Eva-Maria Swidler
Workers in the Global North have a lot to learn from the past struggles of workers in the Global South (as well as in their own countries). Read

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Alison Tate and Evelyn Astor
Labor unions must continue to play an important role in the fight for economic justice and against precariousness. Read

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Author’s Response
Guy Standing addresses points raised by the contributors to this roundtable. Read
 

The Republican intellectual establishment is united against Trump – but his message of cultural and racial resentment has deep roots in the American right

by Timothy Shenk

The Guardian

Au 16, 2016 – The Republican party, its leaders like to say, is a party of ideas. Debates over budgets and government programmes are important, but they must be conducted with an eye on the bigger questions – questions about the character of the state, the future of freedom and the meaning of virtue. These beliefs provide the foundation for a conservative intellectual establishment – thinktanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, magazines such as National Review, pundits such as George Will and Bill Kristol – dedicated to advancing the right’s agenda.

Over the last year, that establishment has been united by one thing: opposition to Donald Trump. Republican voters may have succumbed to a temporary bout of collective insanity – or so Trump’s critics on the right believe – but the party’s intelligentsia remain certain that entrusting the Republican nomination to a reality television star turned populist demagogue has been a disaster for their cause and their country. Whatever Trump might be, he is not a conservative.

That belief is comforting, but it is wrong. Trump is a unique character, but the principles he defends and the passions he inflames have been part of the modern American right since its formation in the aftermath of the second world war. Most conservative thinkers have forgotten or repressed this part of their history, which is why they are undergoing a collective nervous breakdown today. Like addicts the morning after a bender, they are baffled at the face they see in the mirror.

But not all of the right’s intellectuals have been so blind. While keepers of the conservative flame in Washington and New York repeatedly proclaimed that Trump could never win the Republican nomination, in February a small group of anonymous writers from inside the conservative movement launched a blog that championed “Trumpism” – and attacked their former allies on the right, who were determined to halt its ascent. In recognition of the man who inspired it, they called their site the Journal of American Greatness.

Writing under pseudonyms borrowed from antiquity, such as “Decius”, the masked authors described the site, called JAG by its fans, as the “first scholarly journal of radical #Trumpism”. Posts analysing the campaign with titles such as The Twilight of Jeb! alternated with more ambitious forays in philosophy such as Paleo-Straussianism, Part I: Metaphysics and Epistemology. More intellectually demanding than the typical National Review article, the style of their prose also suggested writers who were having fun. Disquisitions on Aristotle could be followed by an emoji mocking the latest outraged responses to Trump.

The Republican intellectual establishment is united against Trump – but his message of cultural and racial resentment has deep roots in the American right

The authors at JAG were not all backing Trump himself – officially, they were “electorally agnostic” – but they were united by their enthusiasm for Trumpism (as they put it, “for what Trumpism could become if thought through with wisdom and moderation”). They dismissed commentators who attributed Trump’s victory to his celebrity, arguing that a campaign could not resonate with so many voters unless it spoke to genuine public concerns.

JAG condensed Trumpism into three key elements: economic nationalism, controlled borders and a foreign policy that put American interests first.

These policies, they asserted, were a direct challenge to the views of America’s new ruling class – a cosmopolitan elite of wealthy professionals who controlled the commanding heights of public discourse. This new ruling class of “transnational post-Americans” was united by its belief that the welfare of the world just happened to coincide with programmes that catered to its own self-interest: free trade, open borders, globalisation and a suite of other policies designed to ease the transition to a post-national future overseen by enlightened experts. In the language of JAG, they are the “Davoisie”, a global elite that is most at ease among its international peers at the World Economic Forum in Davos and totally out of touch with ordinary Americans.

Mainstream conservatives and their liberal counterparts were equally complicit in sustaining this regime, but JAG focused its attention on the right. Leading Republican politicians and the journalists who fawned over them in the rightwing press were pedlars of an “intellectually bankrupt” doctrine whose obsessions – cutting taxes, policing sexual norms, slashing government regulation – distracted from “the fundamental question” Trump had put on the agenda: “destruction of the soulless managerial class”.

A dissenting minority has been waging a guerrilla war against the conservative establishment for three decades

JAG unleashed salvo after salvo against “Conservatism Inc”, the network of journals and thinktanks that, along with talk radio and Fox News, has made defending the party of ideas into a lucrative career path. “If Trump ends up destroying the Republican party,” they wrote, “it is because the Republican party, as it exists today, is little more than a jobs programme for failed academics and journalists.”

News of JAG began circulating on the right shortly after its debut early in the primary season. “The first time I heard someone refer to it, I thought it was a joke,” says former George W Bush speechwriter David Frum. But it quickly found an audience. “They got a huge response almost immediately,” says conservative activist Chris Buskirk, who recalled excited emails and frantic texting among his colleagues. In June, the Wall Street Journal columnist and former Ronald Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan alerted her readers to the “sophisticated, rather brilliant and anonymous website”. A link from the popular rightwing website Breitbart News drove traffic even higher, and JAG seemed poised to shape the discussion over the future of conservatism.

Then it disappeared. Months of posts, totalling more than 175,000 words, were scrubbed from the internet, replaced by a note labelling the site an “inside joke” that had spiralled out of control. Within the right, rumours swirled about the real motives behind the vanishing act; fans of JAG took its self-immolation as further evidence that the conservative establishment would not tolerate any dissent. But the brief life of the Journal of American Greatness did more than provide grist for feverish speculation on Twitter. Patrolling the boundaries of acceptable thought on the right has always been one of the central duties of the conservative intellectual, and JAG’s voluntary purging was the latest chapter in a long battle to define the meaning of conservatism.

Conservatives tend to portray their cause as the child of a revolt against the liberal status quo that began in the aftermath of the second world war, gained momentum in the 1950s when a cohort of intellectuals supplied the right with its philosophical underpinning, attained political consciousness in Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, and won vindication with Ronald Reagan’s election to the White House. Ideas have consequences, they proclaimed. Just look at us.

But there is another way of interpreting the history of the American right, one that puts less emphasis on the power of ideas and more on power itself – a history of white voters fighting to defend their place in the social hierarchy, politicians appealing to the prejudices of their constituents so they can satisfy the wishes of their donors, and the industry that has turned conservatism into a billion-dollar business.

White segregationist demonstrators protesting in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1959. Photograph: Universal History Archive/UIG via Getty Images

This is the explanation preferred by leftwing critics, who typically regard the Republican party as a coalition fuelled by white nationalism and funded by billionaires. But this line of attack also has a long history on the right, where a dissenting minority has been waging a guerrilla war against the conservative establishment for three decades. Now the unlikely figure of Donald Trump has brought in a wave of reinforcements – over 13 million in the primaries alone. Their target is the managerial elite, and their history begins in the run-up to the second world war, when a forgotten founder of modern American conservatism became a public sensation with a book that announced the dawning of a civilisation ruled by experts.

The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World was the most unlikely bestseller of 1941. The author, James Burnham, was a philosophy professor at New York University who until the previous year had been one of Leon Trotsky’s most trusted counsellors in the US. Time called Burnham’s work a grim outline of “the totalitarian world soon to come” that was “as morbidly fascinating as a textbook vivisection”.

The son of a wealthy railway executive, Burnham graduated near the top of his class in Princeton in 1927 before studying at Oxford and then securing his post at NYU. But the Great Depression radicalised him, and he began a double life, lecturing on Aquinas by day and polemicising against capital by night. By 1940, Burnham had lost his faith in the revolution of the proletariat. While Trotsky denounced his erstwhile disciple as an “educated witch doctor”, Burnham started work on the book that would justify his apostasy.

According to Burnham, Marxists were right to anticipate capitalism’s imminent demise but wrong about what would come next. Around the turn of the 20th century, he claimed, the scale of life had changed. Population growth surged, immense corporations gobbled up smaller rivals, and government officials struggled to expand their powers to match the growing size of the challenges they faced.

These structural changes fundamentally altered the distribution of power in society. In the 18th century, authority had rested with aristocrats; in the 19th century with capitalists; in the 20th century it had passed on to the managers, whose authority derived from their unique ability to operate the complex institutions that now dominated mass society.

Technocrats had become the new ruling class. According to Burnham, fascism, Stalinism and Franklin D Roosevelt’s New Deal were all products of this transformation, and there was no use struggling against the world that was coming into being – a world where state ownership of the means of production had become the norm, where sovereignty had shifted to a bureaucratic elite, and where the globe was divided into rival superstates.

Burnham was not the first to foresee a society run by managers, but the arguments he borrowed from others took on a different meaning when brought together in this form. His sweep was global, his narrative reached back centuries, and he almost seemed to welcome a totalitarian future. For Burnham, the only sensible response to the managerial revolution was to recognise that it had occurred and accept there was no point in trying to bring back a world that was already lost. This bleak forecast captured the public imagination. Fortune called it “the most debated book published so far this year” and it went on to sell more than 200,000 copies.

William F Buckley Jr collects an honorary doctorate from Yale University, 2000. Photograph: Bob Child/AP

But Burnham quickly moved on to new territory. His true subject, he concluded, was power, and to understand power he needed a theory of politics. Marx had been his guiding influence in The Managerial Revolution; now he turned to Machiavelli, constructing the genealogy of a political theory that began with the author of The Prince and continued into the present.

For a Machiavellian, Burnham wrote, politics was an unending war for dominance: democracy was a myth, and all ideologies were thinly veiled rationalisations for self-interest. The great mass of humanity, in Burnham’s dark vision, would never have any control over their own lives. They could only hope that clashes between rival elites might weaken the power of the ruling class and open up small spaces of freedom.

Burnham’s newfound zeal for defending freedom led him, in 1955, to a conservative magazine called National Review, and to the magazine’s charismatic young founder, William F Buckley Jr. Buckley’s goal was to turn a scattered collection of reactionaries into the seeds of a movement. His journal set out to make the right intellectually respectable, stripping it of the associations with kooks and cranks that allowed liberals to depict it as a politics for cave-dwellers who had not reconciled themselves to modernity. Burnham was there at the start, one of five senior editors on the masthead of the first issue.

Soon Burnham was Buckley’s ranking deputy. But in an editorial staff riven by abstract debates between ardent libertarians and devout Christians, Burnham was the pragmatist who urged his colleagues not to ask politicians for more than the electorate would accept. For the right to win over working-class voters, Burnham argued, the movement had to embrace a more populist economic policy – contrary to the wishes of his anti-statist colleagues and their corporate backers, who wanted to lower taxes on the rich and roll back the welfare state. “Much of conservative doctrine,” Burnham wrote in 1972, “is, if not quite bankrupt, more and more obviously obsolescent.” Less than a decade later, Ronald Reagan was president, and it was Burnham who seemed like a relic of the past.

For a long time, the only major study of Burnham’s work was a slim volume published in 1984 by a minor academic press under the title Power and History. The book’s author, Samuel Francis, seemed a typical product of the insurgent conservative movement Burnham had helped to create – though by the late 1990s, when Francis published an updated version of Power and History, it made more sense to speak of a new conservative establishment. Outsiders who arrived at the White House with Reagan had become senior executives in Conservatism Inc. With the end of the cold war, the right had lost the glue that had bound its coalition, but there were still battles to be waged, and the money was better than ever.

Francis was never going to become a star in the emerging rightwing infotainment complex. Shy and overweight, with teeth stained from smoking, he had difficulty making it through cocktail parties. After completing a PhD in British history at the University of North Carolina, Francis left academia for Washington – first working at a rightwing thinktank, then serving as an aide to a Republican senator, and finally joining the editorial staff of the capital’s influential conservative daily newspaper, the Washington Times.

Francis retained his academic interests while he ascended into the ranks of the conservative establishment. He published six books in his lifetime, but he worked in private on one massive volume that he hoped would bring together all the disparate strands of his thought. Finished in 1995 but not discovered until after his death a decade later, the result was published earlier this year under the title Leviathan and Its Enemies. It is a sprawling text, more than 700 pages long, digressive, repetitive and in desperate need of an editor.

It is also one of the most impressive books to come out of the American right in a generation – and the most frightening. It is a searching diagnosis of managerial society, written by an author looking for a strategy that could break it apart.

Like much of Francis’s writing, Leviathan and Its Enemies began with Burnham – in this case, quite literally. “This book,” Francis announced in the first sentence, “is an effort to revise and reformulate the theory of the managerial revolution as advanced by James Burnham in 1941.”

Paleoconservatives depicted themselves as spokesmen for the forgotten residents of flyover country

Francis agreed that society had been taken over by managers, but he believed the new ruling class was far more vulnerable than Burnham had realised. Not everyone had benefited from the rise of the experts – and Francis saw this unequal distribution of rewards as the managerial regime’s greatest weakness.

For reasons he never quite explained, he insisted that the cosmopolitan elite threatened the traditional values cherished by most Americans: “morality and religion, family, nation, local community, and at times racial integrity and identity”. These were sacred principles for members of a new “post-bourgeois proletariat” drawn from the working class and the lower ranks of the middle class. Lacking the skills prized by technocrats, but not far enough down the social ladder to win the attention of reformers, these white voters considered themselves victims of a coalition between the top and bottom against the middle.

According to Francis, this cohort had supplied the animating spirit of rightwing politics since the death of Franklin Roosevelt in 1945. They had supported Goldwater – but Francis regarded Goldwater’s programme, like the “movement conservatism” of the National Review, as a “quaintly bourgeois” throwback to the oligarchic politics of the 19th century, with nothing to offer the modern working man. Their tribune was not Goldwater but George Wallace, the notorious segregationist and Democratic governor of Alabama – who won five southern states as an anti-civil rights third-party candidate in the 1968 presidential election. Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan had appealed to this group, too, but neglected their interests after taking office. Despite having elected multiple presidents, the post-bourgeois proletariat had yet to find a voice.

Third-party presidential candidate George Wallace campaigns in Boston, 1968. Photograph: AP

Yet Francis had difficulty explaining why managerial society would generate so much opposition in the first place. In Leviathan and Its Enemies, he argued that resistance to the cosmopolitan elite would be driven by “immutable elements of human nature” that “necessitate attachment to the concrete and historical roots of moral values and meaning”.

He was more candid in a speech he gave while working on the book. “What we as whites must do,” he declared, “is reassert our identity and our solidarity, and we must do so in explicitly racial terms through the articulation of a racial consciousness as whites.” Where mainstream conservatives depicted the US as a nation whose diverse population was linked by devotion to its founding principles, Francis viewed it as a racial project inextricably bound up with white rule. The managerial revolution jeopardised this racial hierarchy, and so it must be overthrown.

Francis delivered his remarks on racial consciousness at a conference organised by American Renaissance, an obscure journal devoted to promoting white nationalism. Years earlier, Francis had struck up a friendship with Jared Taylor, who went on to found the magazine with Francis’s encouragement. From their first encounter, Taylor recalled, he and Francis “understood each other immediately”.

Francis’s employers at the Washington Times were not as sympathetic. The paper fired him after his comments were released, a move that was part of his larger expulsion from the respectable right. Buckley himself dismissed Francis as “spokesman” for a group that had “earned their exclusion from thoughtful conservative ranks”.

Yet Francis would not be so easily purged. For years he had cultivated a relationship with Pat Buchanan, a one-time Nixon protege who had become one of the country’s most recognisable conservatives thanks to his role as co-host of CNN’s popular debating programme Crossfire. In 1992, Buchanan launched a long-shot campaign against incumbent president George HW Bush that, against all expectations, garnered almost 3m votes in the primaries. While all this was going on, Buchanan was growing closer to Francis, whom he later called “perhaps the brightest and best thinker on the right”.

Francis and Buchanan were linked by their association with a breakaway faction on the right known as paleoconservatism. While mainstream conservatives had taken advantage of cushy gigs in New York and Washington, paleocons depicted themselves as spokesmen for the forgotten residents of flyover country. Francis urged Buchanan to make another run for the White House in 1996, this time as the candidate of the post-bourgeois resistance. That campaign would be based on three issues: protectionism, opposition to immigration and an “America First” foreign policy that repudiated global commitments and foreign interventions in order to focus on defending the national interest.

Buchanan listened, and he went on to a surprise win in New Hampshire’s pivotal early primary, convincing Francis that the managerial elite was more vulnerable than at any point in his lifetime. While mainstream Republicans and Democrats celebrated forecasts that the US population was on track to become less than 50% white as a sign of America’s capacity to adapt and grow, Francis believed that the members of his post-bourgeois proletariat regarded these shifting demographics as another reminder of their dwindling power.

Buchanan’s campaign fizzled after New Hampshire, but Francis had a ready explanation for the collapse: Buchanan was too loyal to the Republican party to seize the opportunity he had been granted. “Don’t even use the word ‘conservative,’” Francis told Buchanan. “It doesn’t mean anything any more.” The managerial class had absorbed Buckley and his followers. They, too, were the enemy.

After Buchanan’s defeat and his own exile from mainstream conservatism, Francis devoted himself to what he called “racialpolitik”. He was a regular contributor to outlets promoting white racial consciousness – becoming, in Jared Taylor’s words, “the intellectual leader of a small but growing movement”. Francis denied that he was a white supremacist, but he condemned interracial sex, warned of “incipient race war” and drafted a manifesto for a white nationalist group arguing: “The American people and government should remain European in their composition and character.”

Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan at the Cross Roads of the West gun show in Phoenix, Arizona, 1996. Photograph: Jim Bourg/Reuters

When he looked ahead, Francis was especially concerned with the threat that one rising political star posed to his vision of the future. Barack Obama, he remarked in 2004, was “the model of what the New American is supposed to be”. Ivy League-educated, effortlessly cosmopolitan, promising to transcend barriers of race – Obama was the embodiment of the managerial elite. He represented everything Francis loathed about the contemporary United States.

The fact that Obama, Francis’s symbol for American decadence, became one of the most popular figures in the country brought the great contradiction of his thought into relief. The 19th century belonged to the bourgeoisie and the 20th century to the managers, he argued, because these rising classes had performed necessary social functions. His post-bourgeois proletariat, by contrast, were on the decline.

So was Francis. The supposed realist who cast hunger for power as the driving force of world history spent most of his time writing for journals with subscribers in the low five figures. In his last years, he was a lonely man. Before his sudden death from a cardiac aneurism in 2005, he had begun a study of conservatism and race. His masterpiece, Leviathan and Its Enemies, was still tucked away in a box of floppy disks; when it was published 11 years later, it would be under the auspices of a white-nationalist press. The right-leaning Washington Examiner ran one of his few obituaries. “Sam Francis,” it said, “was merely a racist and doesn’t deserve to be remembered as anything less.” It seemed just as likely that Francis would not be remembered at all.

“I want you to really listen to this,” Rush Limbaugh told his listeners in January this year. The king of rightwing talk radio was lecturing his audience, which averages around 13 million people a week, on Samuel Francis. Prompted by a magazine article casting Francis as the prophet of Trumpism, Limbaugh read aloud from one of Francis’s post-mortems on the Buchanan campaign. “What’s interesting,” Limbaugh said, “is how right on it is in foretelling Trump.” Before abandoning the subject, he added one point. Francis, Limbaugh noted, “later in life suffered the – acquired the – reputation of being a white supremacist”, a reputation Limbaugh insisted was undeserved.

The white nationalists who rallied to Francis in the last decade of his life disagree on that point, but they also see Trump as a vindication of their longtime inspiration. “Sam would have said that Trump is doing exactly what he advised Patrick Buchanan to do,” maintains Jared Taylor, who made news in the primary season when it was revealed that he had recorded automated phone messages endorsing Trump. (“White Supremacist Robocall Heartily Urges Iowa Voters to Support Trump,” reported a headline in the conservative Daily Caller.) According to Taylor’s American Renaissance, “Francis would be very pleased to see the GOP and conservative establishments mocked and destroyed.”

Even liberal commentators are looking back at Francis – whose prediction of a white working-class backlash against a globalist ruling elite seems to be coming true not just in the US but across Europe. “If you just drop the white nationalism a lot of Francis makes sense,” says Michael Lind, who once worked as an assistant to Buckley but now describes himself as a “radical centrist”. According to Lind, conservatives have been “spurning their natural constituency – the mostly white working class”, creating space for the rise of Trump.

Francis was also an inspiration for the team at the Journal of American Greatness, who called him “the closest thing to what could be described as the source of Trumpian thought” in their very first post. They admitted that Francis’s writing “overtly indulges various Southern nostalgias”, but insisted that his “deservedly criticised statements on race” could be separated from the core of his analysis. The managerial class was still the enemy, and only Trump seemed even dimly aware of what it would take to mount an effective challenge.

The authors of JAG looked at the problems facing the US and concluded that Donald Trump might be the answer

But the authors at JAG wanted to do more than add chapters to the history Francis had already sketched. While they remain anonymous, sources have identified them as part of a conservative establishment located outside the Washington-New York axis that dominates the intellectual life of the American right – probably associated with the California-based Claremont Institute and the midwestern Hillsdale College.

Trump the candidate, they admitted, was at best an imperfect messenger. But it was the message that counted: “The American regime – like nearly all its cousins in the west – has devolved into an oligarchy.” JAG was not just arguing that Trump’s campaign had a coherent agenda – a controversial assertion, given that many on both the left and right have dismissed Trump as an unhinged demagogue jabbing randomly at pressure points in the electorate. It was arguing that Trump succeeded because of his platform. Without those ideas, he would have been just another novelty candidate. Armed with them, any of Trump’s more disciplined rivals might have stolen the nomination from him – but instead they opted for recycled bromides from the Reagan era.

The site could be fiery in its defence of Trump, but the best moments came when its targets were the grandees of the right. There are plenty of scathing articles about rightwing thinktanks written from the left, but none of their authors could write a sentence such as “Seeing conservatives court billionaires – which I have had occasion to do dozens, if not hundreds, of times – is like watching dorks tell cheerleaders how pretty they are.”

For all that, the authors of JAG were still thinkers who looked at the problems facing the US and concluded that Donald Trump might be the answer. They denounced conservatives for accepting “the leftist lie” that having a “natural affinity for people who look, think and speak” alike “is shameful and illegitimate”. “The ceaseless importation of people unaccustomed to liberty,” they wrote – referring to “mass third world immigration” – “makes the American people less fit for liberty every day”. Islam was a subject of particular concern. “What good,” they asked, “has Muslim immigration done for the United States and the American people?” Francis would have approved.

With its archive deleted, JAG’s internet presence is now confined to the occasional mournful tweet from one of its former readers, but the problems it identified on the right are more glaring than ever. “The conservative movement’s mission has become providing comfortable professional livelihoods to literally hundreds of people,” David Frum told me recently. Although this behemoth has proved effective at turning a profit, the intellectual returns on the investment have been paltry. “Conservatism was a lot more creative and effective when it had less money,” Frum said.

This narrowing of intellectual ambitions has coincided with a crisis of authority. When asked to name the dominant theme of the right’s intellectual history since George W Bush left office, conservative journalist Michael Brendan Dougherty responded with one word: “disintegration”. Buckley has been dead for the better part of a decade, and no successor has emerged with the clout to take up his role as arbiter of the true faith.

Meanwhile, the little magazines that once set the tempo of debate have struggled to maintain their influence in the age of social media. “Twenty years ago if you got the summer internship at National Review you were high-fiving everyone you knew,” one conservative activist told me. “That was like getting the Goldman Sachs internship. You were set.”

Charles Kesler, a senior fellow at the Claremont Institute and professor at nearby Claremont McKenna College, sees a generational change underway. His best students, he says, used to seek out three paths: some went into academia, others into politics, and a third group tried to navigate a path between the two as writers for middlebrow journals such as National Review. But that middle ground has eroded in the last decade, Kesler says. Now many feel “revulsion” at the state of public debate and take refuge in academia – or they succumb to a “populist tug” and end up at rightwing clickbait factories such as Breitbart News. That pull will only grow stronger now that Trump has shown how little influence establishment conservatives have over the constituency they claim to represent.

In Washington, a policy-minded cohort dubbed the reformicons has become the great hope for conservatives planning their response to the rise of Trump. Long before this year’s campaign, they had begun to devise a more populist agenda to appeal to the working-class voters who have become an increasingly significant part of the Republican electorate. With an eye to the future, they are also convinced that Republicans need to reject Trump’s brand of white identity politics if it hopes to win elections in a country becoming more diverse by the day.

From the reformicon perspective, Trump represents a pathological response to the legitimate complaints of voters whose concerns have been overlooked for too long. The challenge for savvy Republican politicians is to convert the impulses that have propelled Trump’s rise into a platform that can appeal to a multiracial coalition.

Donald Trump speaks at the Republican national convention in Cleveland, Ohio, July 2016. Photograph: Mike Segar/Reuters

Yet the well-intentioned reforming wonks have struggled to find an audience outside the capital. Part of the problem is financial. “There’s no money from rich donors even for reasonable populism,” says Michael Lind. To the ears of conservative billionaires, pleas for economic policies that appeal to workers sound like the prelude to tax hikes on the wealthy. For a Washington-based movement offering what the sceptics at JAG called “managerialism with a human face”, a lack of wealthy donors is a potentially fatal obstacle.

Of all the forces unleashed by the rise of Trump, the one that may pose the greatest threat to the relevance of the conservative intellectual establishment is the gleefully offensive movement known as the alt-right. Nurtured by online forums such as Reddit and 4chan, along with white-nationalist standbys such as American Renaissance, the alt-right has become a vehicle for the simmering anger of mostly white and mostly young men – with strong links to the earlier varieties of racialpolitik promoted by Francis, who is sometimes cited as a founder of the alt-right. Mainstream conservatives have reacted with shock and horror to this development. “The nasty mouth-breathers Buckley expelled from conservatism have returned,” declared a typical response from Commentary, one of the major journals of the establishment right.

But the new iconoclasts of the alt-right can’t be purged from a conservative movement they have no desire to join, especially when they can reach an audience of millions on social media. If there is an heir today to the young William F Buckley – who launched his career with exuberant attacks on the hypocrisy of the liberal establishment and managed to make conservatism look like a stylish rebellion against the powers-that-be – it might be someone like Milo Yiannopoulos, a professional provocateur who has become a spokesman for the alt-right. At one typical event this spring, Yiannopoulos, who refers to Trump as “Daddy”, delivered a lecture with the title Feminism Is Cancer after being ushered into the auditorium on a throne held aloft by students wearing “Make America Great Again” hats. Yiannopoulos’s critics are rightly concerned that his main agenda is promoting himself, but Brand Milo is a booming business.

The future looks more precarious for the guardians of True Conservatism. They have strong support from leading figures in the Republican party such as Paul Ryan, and retain control over an infrastructure of donors, thinktanks and journals. A landslide defeat for Trump could still revive their cause, but they could just as easily be swept aside by a rising generation of rightwing activists with a more Trumpian set of concerns.

Their brand of conservatism won’t disappear, but it could become more a curiosity than a movement, as it was in the days before the birth of the modern right over half a century ago. “The whole Buckley experiment may have been a passing phase,” says Lind – a strange interlude when a cohort of writers mistook their ideological preferences for the will of the people and, even stranger, provided the basis for an industry based on that delusion. The anxiety that its time has passed lurks underneath all the conservative establishment’s impassioned denunciations of Trump: a fear that his unprecedented victory in the Republican primary has demonstrated it is already obsolete. “I’m a conservative,” Trump said in April, “but at this point who cares?”

But Trump may have unintentionally pointed the way for a new kind of American conservatism, driven by resentment at the globalist diktats of the hated managerial class. Over the last year, that anger has emerged in surprising venues. In language that Francis would have recognised, the billionaire PayPal co-founder and Silicon Valley guru Peter Thiel declared that America is no longer a democracy – since it has become a country “dominated by very unelected, technocratic agencies”.

Thiel has been an outspoken libertarian since his days as an undergraduate at Stanford in the 1980s, and in 2008 he supplied $500,000 for an attempt to create manmade islands that would provide an “escape from politics in all its forms”, but lately he has started to associate himself with a different crowd. In July, following an outpouring of criticism, he cancelled a planned appearance in front of a group that has provided a meeting ground for libertarians and white nationalists, including Francis’s close friend Jared Taylor. But a similar public outcry did not persuade him to drop another speaking engagement earlier that month: a speech on the final night of the Republican national convention, where he had come as a delegate to cast his vote for Donald Trump.

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By Lauren Langman

Introduction

The progressive social movements of 2011, followed by the rise of Left parties such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain, can be best understood as what Herbert Marcuse called the Great Refusal: rejections and contestations of domination reflecting a variety of grievances stemming from the multiple legitimation crises of contemporary capitalism. As Jürgen Habermas argued, the multiple legitimation crises of the capitalist system migrate to lifeworld, the realms of subjectivity and motivation that evoke strong emotions such as anger, anxiety, and indignation that dispose social mobilizations.[1] What is especially evident as a goal of these movements is the quest for dignity as rooted in an emancipatory, philosophical, anthropological critique of alienation, domination, and suffering pioneered by the Frankfurt School—quite cogently argued in Marcuse’s analysis of Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts.[2] But grievances and emotions do not lead to sustained social movements; there must be recruitment, organizing and organization building, leadership, strategy, tactics, and vision. The Frankfurt School’s critique of domination can be complemented by Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in which “organic intellectuals” understand how the system operates (with due attention to the salience of the cultural barriers to change), while also proffering counterhegemonic narratives, organizing subalterns, and initiating “wars of position.” A critical perspective on contemporary social movements provides a politically informed critique with visions of utopian possibility in which membership in democratic, egalitarian, identity-granting/recognizing communities of meaning allows for, indeed fosters, community, agency, creative self-realization, and the dignity of all.

I. Ideology, Hegemony, and Domination

Why do the vast majority of people “willingly assent” to the domination by the few, despite vast economic inequalities, growing hardships, and the thwarting of the self? This has long been one of the central questions for the Frankfurt School’s critique of ideology and character structure in which authority becomes embedded within the self, making possible uncritical acceptance and conformity. These insights provide the rich understanding of the conditions of our age, especially of those that enable (or thwart) emancipatory social movements.

The grievances that result from the contradictions and adversities of neoliberal capitalism need to be articulated by intellectually informed, radical activists. Quite independently of the Frankfurt School, a parallel line of analysis and critique was developed by Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Communist theoretician and organizer who conceptualized “hegemony” as the ideological control of culture, which produces the “willing assent” to the domination of the “historic bloc” (the capitalists) and through which the “naturalization” of the historically arbitrary is presented as normal, natural, and in the best interests of all.[3] For Gramsci, the critique of hegemony and the development of counterhegemonic ideologies and organizational practices are the tasks of “organic intellectuals” who understand the role of culture in sustaining domination. They understand the ways in which the dominant culture thwarts political and social change, which in turn necessitates a cultural rebellion, mediated through the “wars of position” in which counterhegemonic discourses would overcome cultural barriers and the “normality” of social existing arrangements in order to achieve social transformation. One of the major tactics for such organization is so-called “popular education,” which enables people to understand how ruling class privileges are based on the exploitation of the masses. Gramsci’s analysis complements the Frankfurt School’s critiques, while his experiences as an activist provide insights and tools to envision and, indeed, make possible an alternative kind of society.

A. Critical Theory

1. The Psychological Foundations of Politics

The Frankfurt School brought psychoanalysis into the critique of domination. From Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm, they subsequently developed a political psychology in which authoritarianism, an aspect of character acquired in childhood, made possible the embrace of conservative, indeed reactionary politics.[4] The understanding of the superego as internalized authority, showed that people would passionately submit to “powerful,” authoritative leaders in order to gain their love and assuage feelings of anxiety, loneliness, powerlessness, and meaninglessness.[5] Thus, authoritarians are psychologically disposed to embrace the elite’s political agendas that stress toughness, determination, and power. Authoritarianism is typically coupled with a sadomasochistic need to dominate, denigrate, and feel contempt toward the weak and the helpless, and authoritarians typically project aggression toward the out-groups (paranoia).

The early Frankfurt School studies of authoritarianism showed how these authoritarian character structures resonated with fascist propaganda and ideology. In a number of books, papers and empirical studies of working-class Germans, and a large postwar study of Americans, authoritarianism was shown to be highly correlated with the conservative to reactionary political positions that glorified authority, denigrated subordinates, and projected anger and aggression toward the out-groups, especially racial minorities and Jews. Authoritarians are thus generally patriarchal, homophobic, and racist, in addition to being highly conventional, conformist, and maintaining a rigid, black–white, either–or, cognitive stance. The enduring significance of these studies can be seen in the contemporary work of Robert Altemeyer.[6] We might also note that, in many ways, these studies of authoritarianism anticipated some of the recent approaches in cognitive psychology and emotion research.

Nevertheless, while being a crucial aspect of political beliefs and actions, authoritarianism is only a part of the story of the internalization of various ideologies. Following what has been said, it is absolutely essential to underline the fact that people’s political beliefs are not shaped by rational considerations, logic, or evidence. Rather, the character structure and the patterning of various needs and desires shape the ways in which people perceive the world, evaluate events, and choose actions. For Gramsci, the ideological control of culture shaped the production of ideology to produce the “willing assent” to domination. But, without a theory of psychodynamics, he could not explain the motivation of people to assent to their own subordination. In 1930, Freud provides the first hint, claiming that the values, norms and laws of society that demand sexual repression and obedience to social dictates, are mediated through the identification with parents, and become sedimented within the superego.[7] People subsequently develop identities that have been ideologically crafted, but not under the circumstances of their own choosing. The identities of prior generations, shaped by earlier authority relationships, weigh down upon the individual to colonize his/her consciousness and desires in the way that the values of the ruling classes/hegemonic blocs become internalized as essential parts of the individual’s identity and values.[8] That this is not a rational process is also made evident by the studies of authoritarianism and anti-Semitism mentioned above.

One function of ideologies is to alleviate anxieties over uncertainties in this world and, perhaps, over getting into the next world. Moreover, the maintenance of group ties through conformity to group norms and values can be a source of powerful attachments as well as a basis for self-esteem, but this in turn leads to conformity, “groupthink,” and what Marcuse called “one-dimensional thought.” Thus, ideologies are not simply explanations of social reality or misrepresentations of social reality that both mystify and sustain the power of the ruling classes. Rather, ideologies and values are essential components of one’s identity, which has both conscious and unconscious components that are closely intertwined with powerful feelings and emotions. Assent to hegemonic ideologies and/or social arrangements rests upon emotional configurations. As Fromm put it:

The fact that ideas have an emotional matrix is of the utmost importance because it is the key to the understanding of the spirit of a culture. Different societies or classes within a society have a specific character, and on its basis different ideas develop and become powerful.[9]

Fromm continues:

Our analysis of Protestant and Calvinist doctrines has shown that those ideas were powerful forces within the adherents of the new religion, because they appealed to needs and anxieties that were present in the character structure of the people to whom they were addressed. In other words, ideas can become powerful forces, but only to the extent to which they are answers to specific human needs prominent in a given social character.

Not only thinking and feeling are determined by man’s character structure but also his actions…. The actions of a normal person appear to be determined only by rational considerations and the necessities of reality. However, with the new tools of observation that psychoanalysis offers, we can recognize that so-called rational behavior is largely determined by the character structure.[10]

Within Marx’s critique of alienation, there is an implicit social psychological theory of emotions and desire. More specifically, alienated labor estranges workers from their work and the products of that work, rendering people powerless, their lives meaningless, objectified, dehumanized, estranged from others as well as from their own potential creative self-realization (the inherent tendencies of what Marx called a “species being”).

In more modern parlance, alienation frustrates fundamental needs for: (1) attachments to others and communal belonging, (2) a sense of agency and empowerment, (3) social recognition, and (4) fulfillment of one’s potentials as a human being—aware of one’s capacity as a being that can anticipate and shape one’s own future. The various frustrations and deprivations of capitalism thwart fundamental human needs for respect, recognition, and dignity.[11] Alienated labor creates warped expressions of selfhood. The fundamental moral imperative of Marx revealed how capitalism truncated human capacities for community, freedom, and self-realization and how a postcapitalist social order could enable the self-realization and dignity of all.[12]

Political values, beliefs, and understandings are not based on evidence, logic, or rationality but on emotions, feelings, and identities. This important insight, part and parcel of the Frankfurt School’s understandings of fascism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, has been rediscovered by various academic psychologists. People embrace various ideologies because such ideologies, much as Durkheim said about religion, provide people with a sense of solidarity and connection. Ideologies provide people with a sense of agency and empowerment. By incorporating a person into a valorized group, ideologies provide individuals with a sense of dignity and purpose. Thus, the legacy of Marx’s critique of alienation, refracted through a critical psychodynamic prism pioneered by the Frankfurt School, provides us with an understanding of the affinity between the character structure and the embrace of an ideology.

The recent work of George Lakoff has shown how different political orientations rest upon the notions of morality, which reflect the values, role models, and child-rearing practices of one’s early family life (seen as a model for society).[13] The “strict father” pattern fosters a morality based on a competitive orientation and in turn the necessity for strength, toughness, and independence in order to survive in a tough, dangerous world. There is an intolerant, if not punitive, orientation to those who appear to be weak and/or dependent. Conversely, the “nurturant parent” orientation fosters caring, sharing, compassion, and empathy, while creative self-fulfillment is its most important value. But political ideologies rest on more than the gratification of particular desires and, perhaps equally important, is that ideologies depend on restricting contradictory information, barring arguments, facts, evidence, and data that might undermine the given ideology. Insofar as an ideology is an essential part of one’s identity, people actively ward off challenges to it. Ideologies provide a variety of gratifications, not the least of which is to minimize anxiety by organizing reality and providing a sense of meaning to one’s life. Various defense mechanisms protect one’s identity and enable one to function in everyday life.

The first line of defense is denial, the flat-out rejection of evidence or values contrary to one’s ideology. Whether the issue is the single-payer healthcare system, global warming, racial and/or gender superiority, or heteronormativity, the denial of contravening evidence serves to protect one’s self-esteem and dignity, which, in turn, leads the person to reject and/or discredit any information inconsistent with one’s ideology and identity. Closely tied to denial is displacement- deflecting a challenge and/or directing it to an unworthy target. Finally, cognitive dissonance works to eliminate challenges or inconsistencies to one’s beliefs and values. Collectively, such defenses reinforce “one-dimensional thought” and in turn reproduce subjugation to the status quo.

2. Consumer Society: One-Dimensional Thought, New Sensibilities, and Great Refusals

In 1964, writing at a time of growing affluence, Marcuse noted that the working classes, especially better paid skilled workers, had internalized the “artificial needs” fostered by capitalism and satisfied through consumerism and were thereby incorporated into the consumer society, anchored through consumption-based identities and enjoying mass-mediated escapism provided by the culture industries, while embracing “one-dimensional thought,” devoid of critical reflection. Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man offered a comprehensive analysis of the postwar growth of the consumer society, which was aided and abetted by the promises of growing material abundance as providing the “good life,” which included good sex and promises of ever more prosperity.[14] For Marcuse, behind the goods and goodies of mass consumption was alienation, shallowness, the thwarting of creativity and self-fulfillment. No longer was alienation simply the product of wage labor, but an intrinsic aspect of consumer capitalism. While the writers and poets of the “beat generation” of the 1950s critiqued the complacency, conformity, banality, and superficiality of the dominant culture, Marcuse moved beyond that observation to locate the problem in the intertwining of consumer capitalism and “one-dimensional thought.” Moreover, he claimed that understanding the role of dialectics, contradiction, and negation—amidst conditions of oppression—fostered a “new sensibility” critical of capitalism in general and its many forms of domination, including its production of “artificial needs” that could never be satisfied.

Marcuse’s critique resonated with and was informed young college students and marginalized youth activists in or from the ghettos of racialized minorities. The times called for the Great Refusal—rejections of the system of capitalist domination, white supremacy, patriarchy, inequality, and social injustice that characterized the 1960s. Marcuse’s formulations connected with the civil rights and antiwar movements, feminism, anticolonialism, as well as struggles for sexual freedom, environmental protection, and gay liberation. Meanwhile, hippie movements rejected repressive asceticism and publicly articulated their critique by extolling drugs and sex and rock ’n roll. Marcuse was deemed the guru of these movements and considered especially dangerous by the reactionary forces. Like Socrates, he was accused of corrupting youth; but instead of taking hemlock, he became the intellectual inspiration for progressive scholars and young activists—an influence that endures to the present.

3. Legitimation Crises

How do we move from the critique of the present and the visions of the possible to social mobilizations? Habermas offered a systematic theory of legitimation crises that occur when there are failures in the objective “steering mechanisms” of the systems of advanced capitalist societies.[15] There may be crises of: (1) the economy that produces and distributes goods and services, (2) the political system that sustains the legitimacy of the whole, and (3) social integration secured by ideology and the state. System integration depends on the mechanisms of domination (e.g., the state and the mass media). Social integration and solidarity, as parts of the lifeworld, depend on normative structures—value systems that express norms and identity as well as secure loyalty and cohesion. Each form of integration possesses distinct logics and, in turn, a different kind of rationality. Social integration comes through socialization and the creation of meaningful “lifeworlds,” namely a culture/ideology that legitimates the social system and provides individuals with personal meaning. In contemporary societies, the logic of the state and the market has "migrated" into the subjective and "colonized the lifeworld.” Thus legitimation has subjective consequences in the “lifeworlds” where social and political identities are experienced and performed.

Social movements emerge at the intersections of the system and the lifeworld. Demands for justice and emotional reactions, often in the form of moral shocks, are responses to crises; anger, anxiety, and/or indignation become the triggers that impel and propel social movements.[16] But emotional reactions do not lead to social movements per se. The crisis-engendered collective emotions must be interpreted within the existing frames, or the emergent new frames, that resonate with the actor’s social location, networks, identity, character structure, and values to impel joining or creating the organizations of actors where alternative understandings, visions, and even identities can be negotiated whilst actors engage in collective struggles toward social change. This can be seen as an attempt to retain or recreate meaningful, gratifying identities and lifestyles at the levels of social integration rather than redistribution.

a. The Economic Aspect: The recent crises must be understood as structural crises in which the “steering mechanisms" of capitalism failed. Neoliberalism, with its disdain for state controls and regulations, celebrating the “freedom of the marketplace,” led to the 2007-2008 collapse of financial markets. The dreams of short-term profits based on speculation turned into nightmares. When the subprime mortgage crisis hit, the financial bubble burst, and the stock market plummeted. This was followed by a wave of bankruptcies and, in turn, devastating layoffs and unemployment for many workers, especially the vulnerable “precariat.” The monetary value of many pension funds evaporated. Economic stagnation followed. The meltdown led many ordinary people to question the very legitimacy of neoliberal capitalism. Although, according to many statistical measures, the economy has “recovered,” stock markets are up, construction is up as well as new car sales, a closer inspection reveals that income growth has been stagnant and that the majority of new jobs are at lower levels of skill and pay. With affordable housing on the decline and student loans escalating, approximately one-third of college students now live at home with their parents.[17]

b. The Political Aspect: The political system attempts to regulate the economic system in order to make possible the profit-making of the elites and the legitimacy of global capital, while minimizing the negative trends that may lead to discontent, protest, and domestic disturbances and/or upheavals. Capitalist states face a twofold problem of maintaining the profitability of the monopoly sector and the low-wage competitive sector while sustaining the legitimacy of the system by providing citizens with infrastructure and entitlements that maintain both economic growth (profits) and promote social peace and harmony. These two main functions are often contradictory insofar as the state must appear “neutral.”[18] The modern state serves to control markets in such a way as to minimize volatility and secure the general conditions of capital accumulation, but, at the same time, it needs to tax the citizenry to provide functioning infrastructure and social benefits. Moreover, in the time of financial crisis, the state is the only institution with the resources to deal with its consequences.

The legitimacy of the US state, and many others across the world, was challenged by the meltdown and subsequent bailouts that helped the elites who had rigged the system. In 2011, the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protesters chanted, “The banks got bailed out, we got sold out.” While the economy was stabilized at great cost to the vast majority of people, the result was a “global slump,” with high unemployment, especially for the young. The state was seen as boosting the profits of “the 1%”—the epithet for the wealthy elite and powerful during OWS. The protests in the squares, streets, and other public sites were directed against the governments and challenged their legitimacy. More often than not, they were met with ruthless violence that quelled the protests for the time being, but, at the same time, also inspired future mobilizations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in some cases, as evidenced, for example, in the rise of Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain, organic intellectuals can organize discontent, fashion political movements, and gain political power.[19] Perhaps the same discontent, progressive mobilization, and hope have found their expression in the strong support for Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaign by many in the US, notwithstanding the very low historical odds for a left-wing outsider to get a presidential nomination, let alone win the election.

c. The Cultural Aspect: The cultural system of meanings, values, norms and interpretations of reality express the identity of the society, regulate conduct and maintain cohesion and integration. The values of every society are shaped by the ruling classes to sustain their power. But today we see questions about the cultural values that underpin enormous wealth for the elites. Today, large numbers of youth, perhaps as many as 50 percent, have become much more sympathetic to socialism, especially since the equation of socialism with the long past eras of Stalin or Mao falls upon deaf ears. The protests and mobilizations seek more than economic redress, millions of youth seek a major social/cultural transformation informed by the visions of an alternative system based upon human needs, democratic communities, and careers that provide individual self-realization, creativity and dignity.

d. The Utopian Aspect: Movements depend on the shared interpretations of reality and the frameworks which explain the causes and consequences of adversities as well as the goals to be attained and the strategies to attain them. Marx generally rejected “Utopian socialism” as such, but emancipatory possibilities came with the transcendence of private property, namely the cultivation of artistry, caring, creativity, curiosity, empathy, faith, honor, humor, love, sensitivity, and other virtues celebrated by healthy, life-appreciating people everywhere.^[20] Utopian values contain the critique of the contradictions of capitalism, which thwarts their realization, since promoting human good would cut profits. As Jacoby pointed out there is a vital legacy of “messianic utopianism” in critical theory that envisions more than a just, egalitarian, democratic version of contemporary society, but a radical transformation of society into the post capitalist forms in which private property is longer the defining feature.[21] The utopianism found in Martin Buber, Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, is imperative for understanding contemporary movements. But this Utopia is not so much spelled out, but is rather a critique of domination, anchored within the character structure, embodied within the state institutions, and valorized by hegemonic ideologies. When moving from necessity to freedom, human fulfillment can take place in various forms which cannot be specified nor predicted in advance. Utopian goals require locating the desirable within the dialectic of the undesirable, namely, within the conditions created by existing political/hegemonic ideologies which entail their own negation. The overcoming of alienation and domination would transform work from being the necessity for bare survival to being the expression of human creativity and fulfillment that would enable the free development of each and the free development of all.

B. Hegemony

Following Marcuse’s notions of “one-dimensional thought”, “new sensibilities” and “great refusals” and Habermas’ theory of legitimation crises, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony complements the critical theory tradition in explaining how hegemony, in the mode of the ideological control of culture, fosters the willing assent to the power and domination of the given historic bloc. Today, neoliberalism as an ideology valorizes and celebrates the financial, political, and intellectual elites. Hegemony normalizes the historically arbitrary, renders domination natural, normal, and in the “best interests of all”, and thereby sustains the political/economic power of particular historic blocs. It is just “common sense,” as opposed to that which, for Gramsci, is the "folklore" of philosophy and may assume countless different forms, but, for the most part, is fragmentary, incoherent, and inconsequential. On the other hand, hegemonic ideologies serve to buttress power and prevent critical thought/action and thereby sustain domination.

Intellectuals, teachers, professors, journalists, novelists, artists, religious leaders, and others, drawn from the coalitions of groups that share the common interest in holding on to power, generally collude in creating and articulating a more or less integrated hegemonic ideology. This begins with the “expert” advice over child-rearing values and practices, school curricula, religion, mass media, especially the news and popular culture, as well as the high culture that collectively and systematically produces worldviews and understandings that legitimate existing class relations and political leadership. “National themes” in collective celebrations and rituals affirm and augment the current society, glorifying its governance and its leaders past and present. Dissenters are marginalized as traitors and pathological characters, as deviant and bizarre. Gramsci’s analysis enables us to bridge critique and alternative visions with praxis as philosophically informed political activity. This is why he called his work “the philosophy of praxis.”

But how and why do people assent to values, worldviews, and understandings that are the basis of their domination and subjugation? While Gramsci was a Communist organizer, he was however quite critical of the economism of the Party. He placed more emphasis on the subjectivity of the worker and the collective will of the masses, which unfortunately had been colonized and corrupted by hegemonic ideologies. These ideologies impacted the structures and processes of socialization to produce general worldviews, values, and understandings that masked the ways in which the system operates. To understand the willing part of the “willing assent,” the Frankfurt School provided a critical social psychology of emotions, explaining how ideologies were actively internalized and incorporated within the individual character, self, and identity. They provided the motivational basis for: (1) the “willing assent” to domination based on the colonized feelings, emotions, and desires that became the intrinsic components of character structure, and (2) the cognitive processes that led to the active denial of the validity of alternative claims and the denigration of the claimants.

In other words, people employ what has been called “motivated reasoning” to accept certain “information” or “evidence” that is consistent with their own values and colonized identities, while rejecting and denying what is inconsistent  with their beliefs and self-images. Thus, identity acts as either a facilitator or a barrier to particular worldviews, cognitive frameworks and understandings which in turn motivate both reasoning and action. The shaping of the character structure generally serves the political and economic interests of the elites, but it also engenders human suffering which in turn may foster resistance and contestation. Capitalist domination alienates and frustrates basic human needs for community, agency, recognition, and self-fulfillment. This contradiction between the demands of the system and the thwarting of human fulfillment, experienced in the times of crises, becomes the opening for counterhegemonic mobilization.

C. Counterhegemony

How do we mediate between critique and action? Domination fosters resistance, but how does resistance get organized and channeled to foster social change? “Organic intellectuals” from subordinated classes, often themselves the victims of the adversities of capital, find themselves in strategically significant positions for organizing resistance. By bent of character, experience, and formal or informal education or training, they become aware of the contradictions in the system, particularly the chasm between the hegemonic ideology crafted by the elites and the actual life conditions for the subalterns who “willingly assent” to being dominated.

According to Gramsci, the “organic intellectual” acquires the type of critical education typically reserved for the elites. Moreover, having roots and ties to the subordinate classes, he or she is aware of the experienced, if not articulated, ambivalence of subaltern classes and, in turn, the extent to which they may be open to, or resistant toward, counterhegemonic discourses. As Chris Hedges put it:

No revolt can succeed without professional revolutionists who live outside the formal structures of society. They are financially insecure. They dedicate their lives to fomenting radical change. They do not invest energy in appealing to power to reform. They are prepared to break the law. They, more than others, recognize the fragility of the structures of authority. They are embraced by a vision that makes compromise impossible. Revolution is their full-time occupation. And no revolution is possible without them, largely unseen by the wider society, they have severed themselves from the formal structures of power. They have formed collectives and nascent organizations dedicated to overthrowing the corporate state. All revolutionary upheavals are built by these entities.[22]

Few academics have the background, the required experience, organizational skills, and/or available time for the nitty-gritty of social organization and mobilization. Nevertheless, the analyses and critiques of political and economic domination, and the deconstruction of hegemonic ideologies are extremely important tasks and become absolutely necessary antecedents for developing counterhegemonic narratives. Scholars as varied as Georg Simmel, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Frantz Fanon have talked about the “dual consciousness,” the ability to navigate between different, often contradictory, worldviews and social networks. The realms of critique and political activism come together in fashioning counterhegemonic discourses, alternative visions, and the critical understandings of the nature of social reality as well as engaging in the ideological struggles that make actual political transformation possible.

Typically, intellectuals, especially those trained formally or informally in critical theorizing, may understand the world in far more complex ways than many ordinary people. The “organic intellectual,” coming from the subaltern classes, is in a different position to influence subalterns than is the elite scholar. He or she better understands the lifeworld of the workers and knows how to encourage them to comprehend their situation and envision the alternatives. He or she also has a legitimacy in their eyes that an outsider would have to work hard to earn. For Gramsci, every person is an implicit intellectual, a “naïve” philosopher, who tries to make sense out of his or her world. Moreover, at some level, most people become aware of the gap between the dominant culture (ideology) and the actual conditions of their lives. That dissonance creates openings for contestation, especially when crises render the legitimacy of the system problematic. Organic intellectuals understand that the political struggles must begin with the demystification of the dominant ideology. This is why the most significant part of their work consists of organizing so-called “wars of position” in which hegemonic ideologies are challenged through “popular education” that offers not only critique but also a counterhegemonic discourse. Organic intellectuals, as the bearers of counterhegemonic visions, illuminate the contradictions of class, power, and dominant ideologies and articulate alternatives that have the potential of transforming mass consciousness deadened by the sirens’ song of capitalist consumerism.

Contradictions are especially evident during times of crisis when people become more receptive to critique and alternative visions. During crises, people may withdraw their loyalty from the existing social order, creating spaces for alternative views, values, understandings, and even identities. They may become more receptive to organic intellectuals who enable people to see through the contradictions, illusions, and distortions of hegemonic ideologies and better understand their own circumstances.

As Gramsci found out, due to the passivity and fatalism of the Italian workers and their embrace of Catholicism, there were major cultural barriers to the embrace of communism. “Social transformation is a function of the creative role of the masses and of the political ability to articulate a revolutionary consciousness.”[23] From this point of view, the role of organic intellectuals becomes crucial, as the subjective barriers for the development of radical subjectivity among the mass of workers are immense. As Gramsci writes, “Every revolution has been preceded by an intense labor of criticism, by the diffusion of culture and the spread of ideas amongst masses of men.”[24] As Fabio de Nardis and Loris Caruso well summarize, “The basic themes of his writings, therefore, concern the clear rejection of mechanistic and economistic interpretations of Marx’s doctrine and the adherence to a fully historicist and humanist form of Marxism. Marxism is for Gramsci not only an economic science, but first and foremost a worldview that points to an intellectual and moral reform of society.”^[25]

Social transformation then depends on a prior cultural transformation of consciousness that overcomes the existing ideology of the status quo in order to enable a different kind of political economy and social organization.

If the revolution is primarily a process of cultural reform, then both intellectuals and the party, interacting with the popular masses, must work toward the development of a political consciousness and a collective will, corresponding to the elaboration of a historically rooted ideology of transformation. If the aim is the revolutionary seizure of power, it is also true that the subaltern classes, in order to be successful, must work towards creating the conditions for transformation, aiming to be an ideologically hegemonic class well before becoming the dominant social group.^[26]

According to Gramsci, culture is the terrain for revolutionary struggle, where the “wars of position” are necessary before the “wars of maneuver.” A “war of position” is a process which “slowly builds up the strength of the social foundations of a new state” by “creating alternative institutions or alternative intellectual resources within existing society.”[27] Organic intellectuals, understanding the salience of the dominant culture, are essential for organizing workers, and organic intellectuals must be in a dialectical relationship with the mass of workers. “How classes live” determines how people view their worlds, act within them, and perhaps, most importantly, “shapes their ability to imagine how [the world] can be changed, and whether they can see such changes as feasible or desirable.”[28]

Thus instead of offering workers economics or history lessons, organic intellectuals provide alternative cultural understandings that undermine and erode the received understandings (e.g., “common sense”) that sustains the system. They open possibilities for imagining alternatives by showing what people’s lives might be like in a more equitable, democratic, and just society and contrasting that with the existing society where everyday life is a struggle and is without the possibilities of genuine freedom, transcendence, and self-fulfillment, in addition to being torn asunder by episodic crises.

“Organic intellectuals” understand the underlying resentment that workers may have about the system, but which they are reluctant to articulate due to the fear of being ostracized by others and the anxiety that might come from an uncertain future. The key repressive strength of religion qua hegemonic ideology is that it sustains solidarity and assuages anxiety and hence acts as a barrier against social change. This is why the initial task of "organic intellectuals" is the formulation of counterhegemonic discourses that not only critique the existing hegemonic frameworks, but also suggest other, more fulfilling alternatives. Organizing successful resistance requires a long and difficult struggle because the focus of the struggle are centuries-old cultural frameworks.

Much of Gramsci’s work refers to workers, trade unions, and factory councils at the time when production was predominantly Fordist. Conditions changed. For Marcuse, writing three decades later, the stimulating agents of progressive change are more likely to be the young people, students, and marginalized minorities. And, at this time, another fifty years later, it appears that the growing precariat, which includes the same marginalized groups mentioned by Marcuse, can spearhead social and political change. By their very existence, the members of the precariat question the legitimacy of the system as well as the legitimacy of political leaders who are either indifferent to popular concerns, or openly hostile, repressive, and violent.

During the recent mobilizations, some activist groups called themselves the “indignant ones.” This is why some scholars claimed that the quest and demand for recognition and dignity is more significant for the occupiers/activists than material gain.[29] The struggles in the cultural and ideological realm are more salient for the rebels of today than the purely material issues.

II. Contesting Domination

A. From Grievances to Action

Hierarchical societies generate dissatisfaction and discontent. One of the functions of hegemonic ideologies is to suppress, normalize, and mollify the alienated masses. This has been seen in the functioning of religion as an “opiate.” Unlike the premodern modes of production, capitalism, as Marx has shown, requires a constant change, the so-called “creative destruction” to gain ever greater profits; however, the constant change in production, transportation, communication, finance, entertainment, and leisure generates dysfunctions and crises. The Fordist mode of production created vast wealth and, eventually, organized resistance articulated by trade union movements brought into existence the relatively affluent working class; however, as Marcuse noted in One-Dimensional Man, the working class was increasingly diverted from radicalism by the consumerist ideology of mass culture, which eroded its class consciousness and revolutionary potential.

Due to the processes of globalization and the emergence of digital technologies, with post-Fordist flexible production based on the “just in time” arrival of components, automation, and/or import substitution, many jobs—on the basis of which the working class built its affluence— disappeared. At the same time, the anti-union campaigns were successful, leading to the erosion of living standards for most workers who either became unemployed or were forced to take low-paying jobs. This generated a great deal of anger and resentment, and dominant, hegemonic intellectuals attempted to shift the blame on the victims of the system, such as racial minorities and undocumented workers as well as on supposedly liberal government policies. This was soon followed by the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the wave of repressive austerity and retrenchment policies, which gave rise to the 2011 progressive mobilizations across the world. Millions took to the streets and protested, but there has been very little immediate structural change of significance, though change may come.[30]

B. The Party—Organize or Perish

In the 1930s, when Gramsci wrote his major works, the Communist Party was the only significant political organization dedicated to the fundamental transformation of capitalism. While communist or socialist parties were not the major actors in the various uprisings in recent years, in some cases they did play important roles, especially in the 2010-2011 Tunisian uprising and the election of a secular government in December 2014. Why was that the case? Tunisia, a former French colony, was a relatively secular country and had a vibrant civil society with a number of progressive nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movement organizations (SMOs), especially labor unions and women’s organizations. Its universities were secular and included extensive liberal arts programs, quite unlike the universities of many other countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), in which education is either largely technical or, more often, religious.[31]

Thus, in Tunisia, after many years of stagnation, ever growing inequality, hardships and dissatisfaction with the government, compounded by the WikiLeaks’ revelations of corruption of the ruling Ben Ali family, the self-immolation of a fruit peddler became the catalyst for massive demonstrations in Tunisia and then elsewhere. The bulk of the demonstrators were the young people. Broad coalitions quickly formed thanks in large part to the existing networks of progressive organizations and the widespread use of the Internet. From this example, we can conclude that a social movement requires not only "organic intellectuals" and counterhegemonic discourses, but also social organizations with dedicated, professional revolutionaries fully committed to long-term struggles to achieve social and political change. Absent such organizations and leadership, we have the passions of Occupy as well as its brief history.

C. Virtual Public Spheres

Organizing social movements today is both more difficult as well as easier than in the past. The potential actors of today—college students, minorities, and certain members of the precariat—have much more diverse class positions and are generally more geographically dispersed. Today’s college students who take liberal arts and social science classes are likely to be exposed to a variety of critical perspectives, even in those cases when the professors are not especially radical.

Moreover, the importance of the Internet should be stressed, especially in so far as the Internet enables the proliferation of a number of “virtual public spheres,” providing a great deal of critical, up-to-date information as well as the space for various debates.[32] The Internet made possible the formation of the variety of transnational activist networks and “internetworked social movements.”[33] In the 2011 uprisings, for instance, computers, cell phones, tablets, and social media played important roles in organizing and directing the mobilizations and occupations in real-time: activists received information about where to gather and what routes to avoid, and they were able to act in concert even if they numbered tens of thousands. While it is true that the movements in each country had some unique features, the Internet was able to keep millions informed and connected across the globe.

D. Digital Memory

Even though the uprisings of 2010-2011 have waned and receded from public attention, it is evident that these mobilizations are far from being forgotten. There now exist online thousands of blogs, websites, and YouTube videos in which the critiques and analyses by various progressive and radical intellectuals remain accessible. There are also many websites that present well-informed, cogent, radical critiques of the capitalist status quo.[34] Moreover, the ongoing critical analyses provided by radical public intellectuals, such as Noam Chomsky, Cornel West, Chris Hedges, Richard Wolff, and Naomi Klein, are only a mouse click or app button away. These analyses and critiques, unlike the mass media reports of the civil rights, feminist, and antiwar movements of the 1960s, are relatively free of corporate control and censorship.

E. Cohort Flow

As one surveys the political landscape of the US and beyond, the conditions for a sustained political rebellion from the Left appear almost nonexistent. As Gramsci said, these are times that bring the “pessimism of the intellect,” but demand the “optimism of the will.” The reactionary forces of the populist Right, coupled with the fundamentalist evangelicals and neoliberal technocratic elites, seem formidable. Throughout the European Union, various right-wing, if not openly fascist, organizations are growing. Where the Left has gained strength, for example in Latin America and in Southern Europe, it is presently being challenged and disciplined by austerity and reaction.

The wealth and seeming influence of global capital and the near invisibility of strong radical organizations can no doubt give rise to pessimism. Because such pessimism itself precludes the possibilities of change, current conditions require a more critical examination. For Gramsci, the old system is dying, but the new cannot yet be born. This is why we have to move beyond the prevailing pessimism and envision utopian alternatives in the tradition of Marx, Fromm, and Marcuse. The growing inequality and the rising precariat, together with the speculative essence of finance capital, are the harbingers of further crises. Young people and minority communities have borne the brunt of the adverse consequences of neoliberalism in general and the subsequent economic implosion during and in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis. In many European countries, youth unemployment is nearly 50 percent. Approximately 30 percent of college students move back home after finishing their studies, unable to afford rent, college loans, and the essentials of what is considered a “normal” lifestyle.[35] As has been noted by scholars such as Marcuse and Habermas, such youth are the primary agents for social and political change.

What is to be done? The critique of domination is the essential task for “organic intellectuals” who mediate between critical theories and political praxis. They critique the cultural realms such as religion, education, liberal-democratic ideology and media, which mask the domination of capital and sustain hegemony. They organize and wage “wars of position” where an emancipatory critique articulates hope and the vision of a society where caring and sharing displace greed and indifference; where love and community trump anger, hatred, and exclusion; where creative self-fulfillment displaces banal conformity; and, where people find dignity, instead of humiliation.

But how does this happen? We should consider the importance of generational change, observed by Mannheim almost a century ago.[36] The social, political, and economic context of every generation shapes its worldview and endures as each cohort ages, matures, and becomes the mainstream of society. While each generation may itself be exposed to very different conditions, what is especially evident today is how the younger generations seem to be notably more progressive as evidenced by their support for government intervention into the economy. Half of American youth support socialism. Contemporary youth have become racially tolerant, open to differences of gender and sexual orientation, and embrace diverse lifestyles ranging from gay marriage to cohabitation to puffing weed.

Moreover, some of these values are responses to the fundamental changes in the character structure fostered by new social realities. Growing numbers of young people are not simply aware of the adverse conditions of their lives, but are especially receptive to the arguments and analyses of various progressive “organic intellectuals.” Many have given up on the existing political system in favor of an amorphous, but democratic anarchism.[37] This is a good starting point, because it exposes youth to counterhegemonic critiques and alternatives, and encourages them to enter various activist communities.

Conclusion: Whither Mobilization?

As Marx revealed, capitalism rests upon inherent contradictions of ownership and ever changing market factors resulting in inevitable crises. Yet class reproduction over time, notwithstanding crises, is maintained by the combination of ideological justifications, character structures, and emotional dispositions to consent. Nevertheless, amidst crises, we often see various kinds of resistance from sabotage to retreatist forms of cultural escapism; moreover, longstanding grievances may erupt, fostering progressive social movements from below seeking ameliorative social changes ranging from reforms to uprisings and revolutions.

The recent cycle of mobilizations—generated in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis—confirms the historical pattern: (1) when existing class relationships and elite leadership prove dysfunctional, corrupt, or both, and/or (2) when their legitimating ideologies (promising inclusion and a “glorious” future) are in conflict with actual realities of fragmentation and conflict and/or declining wealth and power, then mobilizations may ensue.

Current conditions (e.g., rising inequality, austerity, bleak job prospects for youth) are fostering fundamental changes in the character structure, subjective values, and aspirations. Much like in the 1960’s, many young people today feel alienated from the capitalist system and its dehumanizing culture of competition, shallow consumerism, endless war, and inordinate waste. Unlike the 1960’s, however, we now face economic stagnation and, for most people, the first genuine encounter with “inverted totalitarianism.”^[38] These factors give rise to widespread anger and indignation, which in turn may lead to openness to change and receptivity for the traditions of dialectical critique, including the critical insights of Marx and Marcuse.

The primary task for contemporary “organic intellectuals” is to keep the critical tradition alive and adapt it to our times. Progressive change must begin with the multidimensional critique that is as much concerned with the critique of the prevailing domination as with offering imaginative visions of alternative futures. Such a change will require many dedicated “organic intellectuals” to organize and mobilize the “wars of position” in order to transform the capitalist culture of greed, selfish profit-making, blatant inequality, discrimination, and environmental destruction. The winds of change are blowing, though, admittedly, progressive mobilizations are still weak relative to the power of economic and political opposition. What is certain, however, is that the Frankfurt School’s critical approach to capitalist hegemony, focusing as much on the cultural and psychological aspects as on the political and economic, as elaborated in the works of Fromm and Marcuse, and when brought together with the activist counterhegemonic analysis and strategies of Gramsci, provide us with the needed “optimism of the will.”

[1]

[1] See Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985).

[2] Herbert Marcuse “The Foundations of Historical Materialism” in The Essential Marcuse: Selected Writings of Philosopher and Social Critic Herbert Marcuse, ed. Andrew Feenberg and William Leiss (1932; Boston: Beacon Press, 2007). See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed. Dick J. Struik, trans. Martin Milligan (1844; New York: International Publishers, 1964).

[3] Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

[4] While lacking a theory developmental psychology, Gramsci did note the importance of early childhood as the period in which cultural values were learned.

[5] Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941).

[6] Robert Altemeyer, “The Authoritarians” (unpublished manuscript, 2006),

http://members.shaw.ca/jeanaltemeyer/drbob/TheAuthoritarians.pdf.

[7] Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (1930; New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).

[8] The superego and authority relations were central in the work of Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno.

[9] Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 277-78.

[10] Ibid., 279-80 (emphasis in original).

[11] Lauren Langman, “Political Economy and the Normative: Marx on Human Nature and the Quest for Dignity,” in Constructing Marxist Ethics, ed. Michael Thompson (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 43-65.; Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb,  Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Knopf, 1972).

[12] Langman, “Political Economy and the Normative.”

[13] George Lakoff, The All New Don’t Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (White River Junction, VT: Charles Green Publishing, 2014).

[14] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

[15] Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

[16] James Jaspers, The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

[17] “In 2012, 36% of the nation’s young adults ages 18 to 31—the so-called Millennial generation—were living in their parents’ home, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data. This is the highest share in at least four decades and represents a slow but steady increase over the 32% of their same-aged counterparts who were living at home prior to the Great Recession in 2007 and the 34% doing so when it officially ended in 2009. A record total of 21.6 million Millennials lived in their parents’ home in 2012, up from 18.5 million of their same aged counterparts in 2007.” Richard Fry, “A Rising Share of Young Adults Live in Their Parents’ Home: A Record 21.6 Million in 2012,” Social and Demographic Trends, Pew Research Center, August 1, 2013, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/08/01/a-rising-share-of-young-adults-live-in-their-parents-home/. “In fact, the nation’s 18- to 34-year-olds are less likely to be living independently of their families and establishing their own households today than they were in the depths of the Great Recession.” Richard Fry, “More Millennials Living With Family Despite Improved Job Market,” Social and Demographic Trends, Pew Research Center, July 29, 2015, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/07/29/more-millennials-living-with-family-despite-improved-job-market/.

[18] James O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1973).

[19] It remains an open question as to how effective Syriza has been in so far as the terms of the Greek bailout are still dictated by the Troika and the long-run consequences impossible to predict from this vantage point.

[20] Arthur Shostak, interview by Lane Jennings and Cindy Wagner, “The Futurist Interviews Arthur Shostak,” Future Times, posted on November 28, 2001, http://www.wfs.org/node/350.

[21] Russell Jacoby, Picture Imperfect (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

[22] Chris Hedges, “Why We Need Professional Revolutionists,” Truthdig, November 24, 2014, http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/why_we_need_professional_revolutionists_20141123.

[23] Fabio de Nardis and Loris Caruso, “Political Crisis and Social Transformation in Antonio Gramsci. Elements for a Sociology of Political Praxis,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 1, no. 6 (June 2011): 14.

[24] Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Political Writings, 1910-1920 (New York: International Publishers, 1977), 12.

[25] De Nardis and Caruso, “Political Crisis and Social Transformation in Antonio Gramsci,” 14.

[26] Ibid., 14.

[27] Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12, no. 2 (1983): 162-75.

[28] Kate Crehan, Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology (London: Pluto, 2002), 71.

[29] Tova Benski and Lauren Langman, eds., “From Indignation to Occupation: A New Wave of Global Mobilization,” Current Sociology 61, no. 4, monograph 2 (July 2013); Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012).

[30] In Tunisia, there was democratization of governance, but not the economy. In Chile and Québec, tuition hikes were rescinded, without any fundamental changes in the nature of governance. Syriza, as we noted, came to power in Greece in January 2015, when its party chairman Alexis Tsipras became Prime Minister, but Syriza has not radically changed economic policies. Nevertheless its Spanish cousin, Podemos, is likely to win the 2015 election in Spain.

[31] Neither the US nor the EU will intervene to defend freedom and democracy in any country unless that country possesses geopolitically important raw materials and resources. Tunisia is the case in point.

[32] Lauren Langman, “From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice: A Critical Theory of Internetworked Social Movements,” Sociological Theory 23, no. 1 (2005): 42–74.

[33] Ibid.

[34] See, for example, AlterNet, http://www.alternet.org/; Democracy Now!, http://www.democracynow.org/; Occupy Wall Street, occupy.org; Popular Resistance, https://www.popularresistance.org/; Real News Network, http://therealnews.com/t2/; Truthdig, http://www.truthdig.com/; Truthout, http://www.truth-out.org/.

[35] See note 17.

[36] Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge (1926; London: Routledge, 1952), 276-322.

[37] At the time of this writing, in late 2015, large numbers of youth are flocking to support US Senator Bernie Sanders in his campaign to become the Democratic presidential nominee. His critiques of the injustices of the capitalist system seem to have hit some very responsive chords, and his rallies have attracted tens of thousands of people. Whether he will succeed in gaining the nomination is far from certain, but the enthusiasm and size of the crowds supporting him do suggest that more and more people in the US support fundamental political and social changes; however, whether such transformation can be achieved through the Democratic Party remains very questionable.

[38] The basic contradiction of capitalism is the class-based ownership of private property and competing interests between labor and capital; however, there are also other contradictions: ideologies of freedom, equality, and brotherhood mask domination, inequality, and antagonisms between classes. Capital extolls democracy while actual power is wielded by the financial elites that control the State—what Wolin has called “inverted totalitarianism.” Sheldon Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

David Harvey: ‘The Left Has to Rethink Its Theoretical and Tactical Apparatus.’

FROM ROAR MAGAZINE. David Harvey, one of the leading Marxist thinkers of our times, sits down with the activist collective AK Malabocas to discuss the transformations in the mode of capital accumulation, the centrality of the urban terrain in contemporary class struggles, and the implications of all this for anti-capitalist organizing.

AK Malabocas: In the last forty years, the mode of capital accumulation has changed globally. What do these changes mean for the struggle against capitalism?

David Harvey: From a macro-perspective, any mode of production tends to generate a very distinctive kind of opposition, which is a curious mirrored image of itself. If you look back to the 1960s or 1970s, when capital was organized in big corporatist, hierarchical forms, you had oppositional structures that were corporatist, unionist kinds of political apparatuses. In other words, a Fordist system generated a Fordist kind of opposition.

With the breakdown of this form of industrial organization, particularly in the advanced capitalist countries, you ended up with a much more decentralized configuration of capital: more fluid over space and time than previously thought. At the same time we saw the emergence of an opposition that is about networking and decentralization and that doesn’t like hierarchy and the previous Fordist forms of opposition.

So, in a funny sort of way, the leftists reorganize themselves in the same way capital accumulation is reorganized. If we understand that the left is a mirror image of what we are criticizing, then maybe what we should do is to break the mirror and get out of this symbiotic relationship with what we are criticizing.

In the Fordist era, the factory was the main site of resistance. Where can we find it now that capital has moved away from the factory floor towards the urban terrain?

First of all, the factory-form has not disappeared—you still find factories in Bangladesh or in China. What is interesting is how the mode of production in the core cities changed. For example, the logistics sector has undergone a huge expansion: UPS, DHL and all of these delivery workers are producing enormous values nowadays.

In the last decades, a huge shift has occurred in the service sector as well: the biggest employers of labor in the 1970s in the US were General Motors, Ford and US Steel. The biggest employers of labor today are McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Walmart. Back then, the factory was the center of the working class, but today we find the working class mainly in the service sector. And why would we say that producing cars is more important than producing hamburgers?

Unfortunately the left is not comfortable with the idea of organizing fast-food workers. Its picture of the classical working class doesn’t fit with value production of the service workers, the delivery workers, the restaurant workers, the supermarket workers.

The proletariat did not disappear, but there is a new proletariat which has very different characteristics from the traditional one the left used to identify as the vanguard of the working class. In this sense, the McDonalds workers became the steel workers of the twenty-first century

If this is what the new proletariat is about, where are the places to organize resistance now?

It’s very difficult to organize in the workplaces. For example, delivery drivers are moving all over the place. So this population could maybe be better organized outside the working place, meaning in their neighborhood structures.

There is already an interesting phrase in Gramsci’s work from 1919 saying that organizing in the workplace and having workplace councils is all well, but we should have neighborhood councils, too. And the neighborhood councils, he said, have a better understanding of what the conditions of the whole working class are compared to the sectoral understanding of workplace organizing.

Workplace organizers used to know very well what a steelworker was, but they didn’t understand what the proletariat was about as a whole. The neighborhood organization would then include for example the street cleaners, the house workers, the delivery drivers. Gramsci never really took this up and said: ‘come on, the Communist Party should organize neighborhood assemblies!’

Nevertheless, there are a few exceptions in the European context where Communist Parties did in fact organize neighborhood councils—because they couldn’t organize in the workplace, like in Spain for example. In the 1960s this was a very powerful form of organizing. Therefore—as I have argued for a very long time—we should look at the organization of neighborhoods as a form of class organization. Gramsci only mentioned it once in his writings and he never pursued it further.

In Britain in the 1980s, there were forms of organizing labor in city-wide platforms on the basis of trades councils, which were doing what Gramsci suggested. But within the union movement these trades councils were always regarded as inferior forms of organizing labor. They were never treated as being foundational to how the union movement should operate.

In fact, it turned out that the trades councils were often much more radical than the conventional trade unions and that was because they were rooted in the conditions of the whole working class, not only the often privileged sectors of the working-class. So, to the extent that they had a much broader definition of the working class, the trades councils tended to have much more radical politics. But this was never valorized by the trade union movement in general—it was always regarded as a space where the radicals could play.

The advantages of this form of organizing are obvious: it overcomes the split between sectoral organizing, it includes all kinds of “deterritorialized” labor, and it is very suitable to new forms of community and assembly-based organization, as Murray Bookchin was advocating, for example.

In the recent waves of protest—in Spain and Greece, for instance, or in the Occupy movement—you can find this idea of “localizing resistance.” It seems that these movements tend to organize around issues of everyday life, rather than the big ideological questions that the traditional left used to focus on.

Why would you say that organizing around everyday life is not one of the big questions? I think it is one of the big questions. More than half of the world’s population lives in cities, and everyday life in cities is what people are exposed to and have their difficulties in. These difficulties reside as much in the sphere of the realization of value as in the sphere of the production of value.

This is one of my very important theoretical arguments: everybody reads Volume I of Capital and nobody reads Volume II. Volume I is about the production of value, Volume II is about the realization of value. Focusing on Volume II, you clearly see that the conditions of realization are just as important as the conditions of production.

Marx often talks about the necessity of seeing capital as the contradictory unity between production and realization. Where value is produced and where it is realized are two different things. For example, a lot of value is produced in China and is actually realized by Apple or by Walmart in the United States. And, of course, the realization of value is about the realization of value by means of expensive working-class consumption.

Capital might concede higher wages at the point of production, but then it recuperates it at the point of realization by the fact that working people have to pay much higher rents and housing costs, telephone costs, credit card costs and so on. So class struggles over realization—over affordable housing, for example—are just as significant for the working class as struggles of wages and work conditions. What is the point of having a higher wage if it is immediately taken back in terms of higher housing costs?

In their relationship to the working class, capitalists long ago learned that they can make a lot of money out of taking back what they have given away. And, to the degree that—particularly in the 1960s and 1970s—workers became increasingly empowered in the sphere of consumption, capital starts to concentrate much more on pulling back value through consumption.

So the struggles in the sphere of realization, which where not that strong in Marx’s times, and the fact that nobody reads the damn book (Volume II), is a problem for the conventional left. When you say to me: ‘what is the macro-problem here?’—well, this is a macro-problem! The conception of capital and the relation between production and realization. If you don’t see the contradictory unity between both then you will not get the whole picture. Class struggle is written all over it and I can’t understand why a lot of Marxists can’t get their head around how important this is.

Harvey_FistMoneyThe problem is how we understand Marx in 2015. In Marx’s times, the extent of urbanization was relatively convenient and the consumerism of the working class was almost non-existent, so all Marx had to talk about was that the working class manages to survive on a meager wage and that they are very sophisticated in doing that. Capital left them to their own devices to do what they like.

But nowadays we are in a world where consumerism is responsible for about 30 percent of the dynamic of the global economy—in the US it’s even 70 percent. So why are we sitting here and saying consumerism is kind of irrelevant, sticking to Volume I and talking about production and not about consumerism?

What urbanization does is to force us into certain kinds of consumerism, for example: you have to have an automobile. So your lifestyle is dictated in lots of ways by the form urbanization takes. And again, in Marx’s days this wasn’t significant, but in our days this is crucial. We have to get around with forms of organizing that actually recognize this change in the dynamic of class struggle.

Given this shift, the left would definitely have to adjust its tactics and forms of organizing, as well as its conception of what to organize for.

The groups that stamped the recent movements with their character, coming from the anarchist and autonomist traditions, are much more embedded in the politics of everyday life, much more than the traditional Marxists.

I am very sympathetic to the anarchists, they have a much better line on this, precisely in dealing with the politics of consumption and their critique of what consumerism is about. Part of their objective is to change and reorganize everyday life around new and different principles. So I think this is a crucial point to which a lot of political action has to be directed these days. But I disagree with you in saying that this is no “big question.”

So, looking at examples from southern Europe—solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey—these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach?

I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that the problem with the anarchists is their denial of the significance of power and their inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the refusal to see the state as a possible partner to radical transformation.

There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement—and the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance.

That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized?

To begin with, the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures. How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city—like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization.

There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are therefore terribly important—the center of disease control, for example. How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY-organization. There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities alone.

One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It was successfully enforced in the 1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics.

From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making.

Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’

So you believe this would require some form of authority?

No, there will be authority structures anyway—there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here—but it’s covert.’

Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation?

At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis of the last years, it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option. I think—and I hate to say this—but I think the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right now.

More pragmatic in what sense?

Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me.

It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very narrow demands open up space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity nonsense and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place.

For example, it would be interesting if Podemos looked towards organizing forms of democratic confederalism—because in some ways Podemos originated with lots of assembly-type meetings taking place all over Spain, so they are very experienced with the assembly structure.

The question is how they connect the assembly-form to some permanent forms of organization concerning their upcoming position as a strong party in Parliament. This also goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because without it the bourgeoisie and corporate capitalism are going to find ways to reassert it and take the power back.

What do you think about the dilemma of solidarity networks filling the void after the retreat of the welfare state and indirectly becoming a partner of neoliberalism in this way?

There are two ways of organizing. One is a vast growth of the NGO sector, but a lot of that is externally funded, not grassroots, and doesn’t tackle the question of the big donors who set the agenda—which won’t be a radical agenda. Here we touch upon the privatization of the welfare state.

This seems to me to be very different politically from grassroots organizations where people are on their own, saying: ‘OK, the state doesn’t take care of anything, so we are going to have to take care of it by ourselves.’ That seems to me to be leading to forms of grassroots organization with a very different political status.

But how to avoid filling that gap by helping, for example, unemployed people not to get squeezed out by neoliberal state?

Well there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, so that when the group works with people everybody knows that it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent to politically change the system in its entirety. This means having a very clear political project, which is problematic with decentralized, non-homogenous types of movements where somebody works one way, others work differently and there is no collective or common project.

This connects to the very first question you raised: there is no coordination of what the political objectives are. And the danger is that you just help people cope and there will be no politics coming out of it. For example, Occupy Sandy helped people get back to their houses and they did terrific work, but in the end they did what the Red Cross and federal emergency services should have done.

The end of history seems to have passed already. Looking at the actual conditions and concrete examples of anti-capitalist struggle, do you think “winning” is still an option?

Definitely, and moreover, you have occupied factories in Greece, solidarity economies across production chains being forged, radical democratic institutions in Spain and many beautiful things happening in many other places. There is a healthy growth of recognition that we need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives.

The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive of some of this stuff and I think they are wrong. But at the same time I don’t think that any of this is big enough on its own to actually deal with the fundamental structures of power that need to be challenged. Here we talk about nothing less than a state. So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus.

David Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY). His most recent book is Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism (Profile, 2014).

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

An occasional message from Peter Dreier 

This message is all about the Bernie Sanders campaign, but since it is a national holiday about patriotism, I wanted to include this piece by Dick Flacks and me, "How Progressives Should Celebrate This July 4th," linking it to the recent Supreme Court ruling on same-President Obama’s oration last week in Charleston.
The Sanders campaign is surging, surprising everyone with the large turnouts in Iowa, New Hampshire, Wisconsin (over 10,000 people at a rally in Madison a few days ago), and elsewhere.  He has raised much more money, mostly in small donations, than anyone expected.  He is attracting lots of people eager to volunteer for his campaign, hiring more staff, and picking up some significant endorsements. He is closing the gap in the polls with Hillary Clinton, including in key states with early primaries and caucuses. His campaign is based on a principled progressive agenda that, unlike any other figure in American politics (with the exception of Elizabeth Warren), he is able to explain in straightforward language that has a broad appeal. 
As a result of all this, Sanders is getting lots of media attention. The right-wing media echo chamber (Fox News, Rush Limbaugh, the Weekly Standard, etc) is demonizing him as a dangerous radical but also hoping that his growing appeal will hurt Clinton and help a Republican win the presidency.  The mainstream media (NYT, ABC, Newsweek, etc) is taking advantage of the Sanders surge to create the drama of a political horse race, while asking whether a strong Sanders showing will help or hurt Clinton’s chances to win the White House. The progressive media (The Nation, The Progressive, American Prospect, MSNBC, etc) and blogosphere is greeting the Sanders surge with enthusiasm and excitement but also raising questions about whether he’s in it to win or to push Hillary to the left, whether he can raise enough money to mount a credible national campaign, and whether his presidential campaign, win or lose, can also help strengthen the progressive movement (and the Democratic Party’s progressive wing) for the long haul.

The Sanders campaign has surged so quickly, and things are changing so rapidly, that it may be difficult to grasp what it means.  With that in mind, here is a reading list (all from 2015 unless indicated otherwise) that may be useful for those who want to understand what is happening and to put it in historical perspective. You can also find out more at the Sanders campaign website.

• Bernie Sanders, The Speech: A Historic Filibuster on Corporate Greed and the Decline of Our Middle Class. This book includes the text of Sanders’ eight-hour speech on the Senate floor on Friday, December 10, 2010, that hit a nerve with the American people. Millions followed the speech online until the traffic crashed the Senate server.
• Bernie Sanders, Outsider in the House.  In this 1998 book,  Sanders tells the story of his remarkable career as a progressive activist and public official, including his eight years a mayor of Burlington, Vermont and his campaign to win Vermont’s lone seat in the House of Representatives.
• Bernie Sanders, “Why Not?” Huffington Post, June 30
• Sarah Lyall, “Bernie Sanders’s Revolutionary Roots Were Nurtured in ’60s Vermont,” New York Times, July 3
• Tamara Keith, "Leaving Brooklyn, Bernie Sanders Found a Home in Vermont," NPR, June 20
• Peter Dreier and Pierre Clavel, “What Kind of Mayor Was Bernie Sanders?” The Nation,  June 2
• Tim Murphy, "How Bernie Sanders Learned to Be a Real Politician," Mother Jones, May 26
• Bill Moyers and Michael Winship, “Turn Left on Main Street,” Moyers & Company, June 3
• Stewart Acuff, “Bernie Sanders CAN Be President,” Daily Kos, July 3
• Sophia Tesfaye, “The Real Reasons Bernie Sanders is Transforming the Election,” Salon, July 3
• John Wagner and Ann Gearan, “In Bernie Sanders, An Unlikely, But Real, Threat to Hillary Clinton,” Washington Post, June 28
• Peter Dreier,  "Is Bernie Sanders Too Radical for America?"American Prospect, June 30
• Ben Kamisar, “Sanders Raises $15 Million in His First Two Months,” The Hill, July 2
• Elliot Smilowitz, “Sanders Draws Massive Crowd in Wisconsin,” The Hill, July 1
• Ruth Coniff, "Bernie Sanders Comes to Wisconsin," The Progressive, July 1
• Lauren Gambino and Ben Jacobs, "’Grassroots movement working’: Bernie Sanders gains on the Clinton machine," The Guardian, July 3
• Cassie Spodak, "Sanders Snags Key Endorsement in New Hampshire," CNN, July 4
• Dave Jamieson, “Labor Leader Joins Bernie Sanders’ Campaign,” Huffington Post, July 1
• Eric Pianin and Rob Garver, "Where Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Martin O’Malley Stand on the Issues," Fiscal Times, June 17
• Ben Schreckinger, "When Bernie Met Hillary," Politico, June 17
• Michael Warren, "Bernie’s Moment Now a Movement," Weekly Standard, July 2
• Jill Lawrence, “How Bernie Sanders Fought for Our Veterans,” Politico, July 2
• Chad Merda, “Bernie Sanders Draws Major Ground on Hillary Clinton in Poll,” Chicago Sun-Times, July 2 
• Peter Nicholas,“Bernie Sanders Draws Crowds With His Matter-of-Fact Message,” Wall Street Journal, June 6
• John Nichols, “Ready for Warren Becomes Ready to Fight And Backs Bernie Sanders,” The Nation, June 19

• Joan Walsh, "The Mainstream Media’s Bernie Sanders Trap," Salon, July 2
• Adam Hilton, "Bernie and the Search for New Politics," Jacobin, June 14
• Peter Dreier, "Bernie Sanders’ Socialism is as American as Apple Pie," Huffington Post, May 5
• Harvey Kaye, "Social Democracy Is 100% American," Moyers & Company, July 3
• John Nichols, The "S" Word: A Short History of an American Tradition…Socialism, 2011
• Michael Kazin, American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation, 2012
• Peter Dreier, The 100 Greatest Americans of the 20th Century: A Social Justice Hall of Fame, 2012

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Black Youth Project 100 action to #DecriminalizeBlack (Photo Credit: Sarah Jane Rhee)

By Bernardine Dohrn

Praxis Center

“Those who kill their own children and discriminate daily against them because of the color of their skin; those who let the murderers of blacks remain free, protecting them, and furthermore punishing the black population because they demand their legitimate rights as free men—how can those who do this consider themselves guardians of freedom?”

Che Guevara, Before the United Nations, 12-11-1964

March 4, 2015 – In my lifetime young people rose up to challenge and change the world in Little Rock and Birmingham, in Soweto and Tiananmen, in Palestine and Chiapas. In the last decade we saw the rise of Arab Spring and Occupy, and now we are in the midst of vivid mass resistance to the police killing of unarmed Black men and women spurred by the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Now and historically, it is the youth who reject taken-for-granted injustices.[1] In this moment, young people are the social actors – the leadership, catalysts,  the activists, and the organizers – who seized and defined a continuing travesty of North American life: the police murder of Black lives. Rising up against the thickening layers of institutionalized white supremacy, young people are insisting that Black Lives Matter.

With their radical impulse to revolt, that spirit of hopefulness and possibility, the laser-like insight of adolescents into the hypocrisies of the adult world, propel youth to break the rules, resist together, and transcend the immoral status quo. Inspired by the courage and determination of Ferguson youth, young people across the nation walked out of schools, sat-in, died-in, blocked highways and bridges – becoming the fresh, searing forces for equality, racial justice, and dignity.

Youth were not unaware of the risks they were taking by challenging police violence. In fact, it is young people who were painfully and brutally aware of the police targeting of Black youth, and pervasive US institutionalized de-valuing of Black lives.

Though many young activists had already been challenging police violence and the criminalization of Black lives in their own communities, the harrowing, police stalking and shooting of unarmed teenager Michael Brown on August 9, 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, became the spark that generated a fresh wave of youth uprisings. This new movement in the long struggle for racial justice brought young people together across the country to become more than the sum of their parts.

The activism of the Black Lives Matter movement not only illustrates the brilliance and clarity of young people, but also flies in the face of popular currency that children and youth are less competent, less thoughtful, less wise and more dangerous than adults. The continuing reality of young people as social actors stands in opposition to official policies of silencing, suppressing, expelling and punishing our youth, depriving them of an education and denying their creativity and right to be heard.

Think of young peoples’ loss of rights, for example, through truancy laws; school censorship of high school newspapers, email communication and graduation speeches; the banning of books; relentless harassment and violence against LGTBQ and trans youth; school locker searches and drug testing without reasonable suspicion or due process; school zero tolerance policies that include punishments, school suspensions and expulsions, gang terrorism profiling, stop and frisk, and the calling of police for minor misbehavior. Control, cameras, drug searches, testing, arrests, and school exclusion have replaced dignity.

Rights vs. protections and the myth of the “Superpredator”

Children and youth, in fact, are whole persons who bear human and constitutional rights. They are inevitably an active part of their time and place, their culture and community, their race, class, and ethnicity, and their extended family. Simultaneously, they may also be more vulnerable, more easily manipulated and used by adults, such that they must be, to the extent possible, protected, sheltered and insulated from serious harm, both from their own impulses, and adults who might prey upon them or use youth for their own purposes. This is why human rights activists, for example, advocate for children to be protected from the harshest consequences of war and hazardous labor and family violence.

Of course, young people are becoming-persons, not yet fully adults; but what kind of a person is a child? In considering children as social actors, this contradiction is worthy of continuing deliberation and nuance. How can society heed this paradox – rights versus protections – and tilt toward children as bearers of rights while taking the responsibility for providing youth with equal access, due process, Constitutional rights, economic rights, and human rights? Are youth not right to see the adult world as compromised, duplicitous, and worst of all—indifferent to the crimes and suffering around them? (Continued)

Children were acknowledged as Constitutional persons almost fifty years ago in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of In re Gault.  Yet the with the subsequent repressive wave to restrict their active whole personhoods, U.S. courts and legislators have shrunken the Constitutional rights of children by constricting or eliminating their rights to speech and expression, association, action, education, privacy, health care, due process, equal protection, and their right to liberty (by depriving them of liberty). This has been done in the name of either protecting them and “saving” them from themselves, or by constructing some children as superpredators, fearful, larger- than-life monsters, wolf-packs and gangs out to rob, rape and even kill (white) adults. Consequently, specific populations of children are seen as dangerous and capable of destroying civilization.

The diabolical invention of the 1990s youth predator by law enforcement, academics, and the mass media resulted in the harsh criminalization of youth of color– subjecting them to arrests, incarceration, trials in adult criminal courts, and extreme sentencing. The profound echo of young Black men as “superpredator” would arise again with the Ferguson grand jury testimony of Officer Darren Wilson, who saw in Michael Brown someone enormous, looming up and becoming larger even after being stalked and shot by Wilson six times.

“It looked like a demon,” Wilson told the grand jury.

Fully 75% of youth who are locked up are confined for non-violent offenses. Racial and ethnic disparities are unconscionable, but the naked disproportion of who is arrested, beaten, and killed characterize the entire youth justice system.[2]

At its best, contemporary analysis of children and adolescents recognizes the dialectical nature of youth: being and becoming, categorically less culpable than adults, and with enhanced prospects for recovery, rehabilitation, and “attaining a mature understanding of [one’s] humanity.”[3]  Diminished culpability is not, however, the same as lesser competence or capacity.  Culpability is commonly misunderstood, and the current conversations about adolescent development research frequently becomes an imprecise discourse that easily collapses into language of lesser adolescent competence or moral action.

Military arsenal deployed against Ferguson protesters

The story of the Aug. 9, 2014 police killing of Michael Brown stayed in the news because the young people in Ferguson refused to leave the streets. And although the protests there and nationally was one of the broadest and most sustained radical coalitions in decades, the protesters themselves were largely young, black, queer, poor, working-class, secular, women and trans.

The young people of Ferguson did not back down in the face of a highly militarized small town police force armed with federally-funded Kevlar helmets, assault-friendly gas masks, combat gloves and knee pads, woodland Marine Pattern utility trousers, tactical body armor vests, some 120 to 180 rounds for each shooter, semiautomatic pistols attached to their thighs, disposable handcuff restraints hanging from their vests, close-quarter-battle receivers for their M4 carbine rifles and Advanced Combat Optical Gunsights[4].

There are scattered reports of stun grenade use in Ferguson, also known as flashbangs or flash grenades. This weapon of choice for American SWAT teams (and Israeli soldiers) originated within British Special Forces more than four decades ago. Ostensibly less than lethal, stun grenades have been known to kill or severely injure numerous victims, and the device was recently in the news for burning a 19-month-old baby in Georgia, resulting in a coma, during one of the thousands of domestic police raids this year. They are designed to temporarily blind and deafen, thanks to a shrapnel-free casing that is only supposed to emit light and sound upon explosion

The grenade launchers used against unarmed youth in Ferguson included the ARWEN 37, which is capable of discharging 37mm tear gas canisters or wooden bullet projectiles. The police used tear gas unsparingly in Ferguson. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 actually bans the gas as a permissible means of warfare. Then again, it is allowed for domestic riot control, and nations like Turkey, Bahrain, Israel and the United States who have exploited the loophole to great avail. Tear gas sucks out your organs, hogs your oxygen and burns you inside and out. Interim blindness and extended coughing fits are common, as well as an overall sense that you are dying or dead. These are police weapons against an unarmed, Black, civilian, domestic population.

The use of “pepper balls” is lethal; the Boston Police Department banned them after a young woman was killed by one which passed right through her eye and skull to the brain. She was guilty of being present in a rowdy crowd after a Red Sox/Yankees game in which the former won. The same goes for the rubber bullets, wooden bullet projectiles, and beanbag projectiles on view with the police in Ferguson

Contemplate the Ferguson police department’s possession of the BEARCAT G3, the SWAT team’s version of the military’s Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle, or its MRAP All Terrain Vehicle. This armored tank was donated to the Ferguson police by the US Department of Homeland Security.  There are no known mines or IEDs in Ferguson, an ambush is unlikely, so the decision of the St. Louis County Police Department to roll out (or even own) one of these tanks is apparently the contemporary version of fire hoses and dogs.

K-9 dogs. Yes, the 2014 St. Louis County and Ferguson Police Departments also used growling German shepherds to threaten demonstrators. In addition, these police forces had access to the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), which emits a sound so pain-inducing that is causes bleeding from the ears. LRADs were also on display (though not used) during the Chicago anti-NATO demonstrations in 2011. On top of all this, the police department of Ferguson – a police force that is 94% white, in a town that is 67% Black – not only possessed an armored personnel carrier and weapon loads to intimidate demonstrators, carried out surveillance of the protesters from an MD Helicopter 500 Series in the sky above Ferguson.

Vibrant transformation of the possible

The fierce young, unarmed and highly disciplined young people who dared to stand up against police violence are to thank for revealing to the US public that the war-making hardware, paid for by our tax dollars, is coming home to police forces for use against the Black, Latino, indigenous communities and to patrol US borders.

This military-grade weaponry of the police in Ferguson was not about riot control during the long months leading up to the grand jury verdict in the murder of Michael Brown. It was the arsenal of white supremacy and racial oppression.

In the face of this violent intimidation, young people continued to peacefully demonstrate in Ferguson and to document their struggle at websites like Ferguson Action and using Twitter hashtags like #SHUTITDOWN.

Created in the crucible of Black Lives Matter is a new generation of young, African American organizers and activists, with experience in strategy development, tactics, decision-making under pressure, coalition building, and clarity about long range, radical goals, about their vision. They are savvy and wise, filled with love and caring for each other and for everyone who has suffered the terror of police violence: youth, their families and loved ones, allied people of color, trans and LGBTQ youth, native and Palestinian people, victims of police violence and whole communities.

Thus the Chicago struggle for city reparations for those who suffered police torture and subsequent decades on death row or juvenile life without parole before they were exonerated utilizes art, performance, persistence and unlikely allies. New York activists agitate for divestment from corporation that construct and operative for-profit prisons. There are movements to end solitary confinement from California to Rikers Island, and renewed efforts to commemorate and open old cases of lynchings across the nation.  The struggle for dignity and justice continues in immigrant rights struggles and the fierce, elegant courage of the youth and dreamers who have seamlessly embraced their queerness, their multiple heritages, and their human rights.

All this indicates a vibrant transformation of the possible. Police torture and killing of African Americans is visible, no longer background normal, as Black youth resist being branded as criminals at birth. Their resistance is communal, shared, and collective.

Can we hold the moment? Do we have the knowledge that young people are capable of seeing and seizing what adults cannot imagine?  In the uncertainty and complexity of civil strife and disciplined rebellion, shall we see children and young people capable of being agents of their own liberation?

[1]   Sources for the Ferguson story include: Darryl Pinckney, Ferguson and Resistance Against the Black Holocaust, © 2015 The New York Review of Books, Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate;Chris Crass, SpeakOut | Op-Ed; Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers, Ferguson Exposes the Reality of Militarized, Racist Policing, Popular Resistance | News Analysis; Adeshina Emmanuel, Ferguson Case Highlights Need for National Data on Police Shootings, The Chicago Reporter .

[2]  See the website of the W. Haywood Burns Institute, at www.burnsinstitute.org for racial and ethnic disparities at every stage of the youth justice system.

[3] See the trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases and the accompanying Amicus briefs: Roper v. Simmons (2005) , Graham  v. Florida (2010), and Miller v. Alabama (2012).

[4] See Radley Balko’s Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces (2013) for this research, photos, and the following details of Ferguson police weaponry.

Bernardine Dohrn is the founder and former director of the Children and Family Justice Center at the Bluhm Legal Clinic of Northwestern Law School. She has advocated for fair sentencing for children, for applying international human rights standards here at home, and for ending the over incarceration of children of color. 

By N’Tanya Lee, Cinthya Muñoz, Maria Poblet, Josh Warren-White, and Steve Williams on behalf of the LeftRoots Coordinating Committee

We are living in times of great instability and crisis. Everywhere there are troubling signs of collapse: mass shootings; widespread unemployment; potentially irreversible ecological devastation; and the consolidation of wealth into fewer and fewer hands. The interpenetrating crises within the economic system, the ecological system, and the system of empire are pushing the 1% to implement massive austerity programs, militarization, and further disenfranchisement of oppressed communities. But not everything is gloom and doom. In the face of the ruling class’ savage attacks, heroic struggles are breaking out around the world against the manifestations of imperialism, capitalism, white supremacy, and patriarchy.

While these crises have called the legitimacy of ruling class hegemony into question, it is by no means guaranteed that popular forces will succeed in rescuing the world from the tyranny of the 1%. We are living in a period in which, as Antonio Gramsci once observed, the old order is dying while the new phase is still struggling to be born.

Even though the ruling class faces instability and internal strife, they are armed to the teeth and are committed to holding onto power at any cost. What happens in the next period of history will determine the future of the planet and humankind.

FROM RESISTANCE TO STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

In response to the worsening conditions in our communities, and driven by a deep desire to change the systems that have made conditions so bad for our people, many social movement activists have taken up the work of organizing resistance. This work is critical. But it’s not enough. We need our fights to add up to something beyond resistance.

So often activists in reform fights say, “I don’t think that we’ll ever achieve liberation, but I want to do what I can.” The problem with this attitude is that it closes us off to seeing and seizing opportunities to take unimagined leaps forward. After all, who would have dreamed in the beginning of 2011 that by the end of the year people across the country would be occupying public space denouncing the tyranny of the 1%? Or that fast food workers across the country would be walking off their jobs to demand a living wage? Or, that undocumented youth would be intentionally getting detained so they could organize resistance inside detention centers? Or that there would be a well organized national mass movement against police violence growing out of another police murder of a Black youth?

Holding onto the hope that we could win, that we could radically transform society is difficult, but vital. That hope and audacity can change the way that we organize, fight, and build movements. The problem is that it is almost impossible to keep hope alive if we don’t have a plan to win.

Strategy is one of the fundamental building blocks for all successful revolutionary movements. In revolutionary periods throughout history well-developed strategy has enabled organizers to cohere different sectors of society into a unified movement of movements that was able to defy the odds and transform society. Each of these strategies were as unique as the conditions from which they emerged, and the most successful evolved over time as those conditions changed.

There are no successful cookie-cutter strategies. What worked in one place, at one time, will not necessarily work in another. That said, while every strategy must grow out of its own particular time, place, and conditions, there are some common features of successful revolutionary strategies. Broadly speaking, they:   

• •  Articulate a vision of a transformed society;
   
• •   Examine the characteristics and conditions of society’s social and economic groupings;
    
• •  Project a revolutionary historic bloc by assessing which social sectors have the most vested interest in transforming society, which might support that vision, and which have the power to carry out that transformation;
• •     Evaluate the balance of power between organizations and the interests those organizations represent;
    
• •  Assess the cultural, social, economic, and political hegemony;
      Name collective goals to be achieved by advancing the larger strategy; and
      Identify key fights in which to concentrate forces.

THE NEED FOR THE LEFT

Historically, it has been Leftists from different resistance struggles that have come together to forge a broader strategy for liberation. Although Left forces in many parts of the world are taking bold steps to navigate the twists and turns of the current period with effective strategy, such a Left does not exist in the United States today. There are important Left organizations and formations in this country, but a coherent and audacious Left in the United States will have to be re-constituted if this role is to be fulfilled. (Continued)

The task of re-constituting a radical and relevant Left in the United States faces many serious challenges. Despite these challenges, there are reasons to be hopeful. Along with mass organizations rooted amongst exploited and oppressed sectors, a successful revolutionary movement today will require one or many Left formations which learn from the errors of 20th century Left organizations. In order to be successful this Next Left will need to be:

•  
• •   Strongly rooted amongst key social sectors and geographical regions in order to accurately ground its analysis of the objective and subjective conditions;
   
• •   Capable of strengthening existing social movements. It will need to be respectful of popular organizations and movements, relating to them not merely as conveyor belts or competitors, but as partners which have unique and valuable contributions that are needed to advance the struggle and pave the way for the emergence of a free society;
   
• •   Able to bring the distinct demands of various social movements together into a single political project in ways that those movements see themselves authentically represented. This requires the ability and desire to listen to the wisdom that exists amongst comrades, other activists, and unorganized people;
   
• •   Capable of identifying key fronts of struggle where collective action can shift the balance of power and create new openings; and
    
• •  Constantly searching for opportunities to expand popular protagonism and democratic participation — both inside Left organizations and society in general.

This is a different kind of Left than the self-proclaimed vanguard model that was so prevalent in the 20th century. New types of Left formations are beginning to prosper in countries like Greece, South Africa, Venezuela, and Bolivia. These political instruments are helping to establish new models and new practices that we have a lot to learn from, despite our different context in the United States.

Developing grounded strategy for liberation, and developing cadre capable of carrying out that strategy are two central tasks of a building a liberatory movement of movements in the United States today.

LEANING FORWARD

History is not flat. It ebbs and flows like the tide. Recent events in Egypt are a prime example of this. After decades of isolated workers’ strikes and anti-police brutality organizing, a movement that mobilized millions of people erupted. In a matter of weeks, the people of Egypt deposed a U.S.-backed dictator who had been in power for decades. The tasks for revolutionaries change depending on the nature of the period in which they’re working. During ebbs, we engage in fights, build our forces, and prepare to advance. Most struggles during these periods take place within a political context that is not to our advantage. During flows, we advance. We surge forward. These periods of flow often correspond to structural crises and offer revolutionaries opportunities to gain ground and shift the terrain for future struggle.

We believe we are in a period of flow in which crisis is likely to expand. Instability will become the norm. In response, the ruling class will likely exert their power through violence and intimidation more than through concessions and persuasion. This will lead to more action from both the Right wing as well as popular forces. Global instability will allow many nations outside of the First World to explore building alternatives outside of U.S. imperialism. This will be especially true in the Global South.

These moments are when revolutionaries can begin to make possible what until recently seemed impossible. These moments hold untold challenges and opportunities. In order to advance, revolutionaries must be prepared. History suggests that progressive advance will require a strong and skilled Left. In order to help meet that need we have begun building LeftRoots, a national formation of Left social movement organizers and activists who want to connect grassroots struggles to a strategy to win liberation for all people and the planet.

We do not yet have a fully developed strategy, but based on a cursory assessment of the current conditions and the imbalance of political forces in the United States, LeftRoots has developed an outline of some of the tasks needed to strengthen the position of the Left, weaken the position of the Right, and win the trust and loyalty of important sectors of U.S. society:

• •  Build popular organizations. Mass organizations are the basic building block of all revolutionary movements. These organizational forms allow people to rebuild community; to make connections between their own struggles, the struggles of their neighbors, and their connections to the system; and they allow people to take collective action. Too often, these organizations have been seen as conveyor belts feeding information and resources to more strategic parts of the movement. We believe that these organizations must be vital participants in any liberation movement. Popular organizations generate energy, innovation, and wisdom that must be respected and supported.
• •   Wage counter-hegemonic fights. As the crisis continues to deepen, people will rise up and take action, calling for change. In different places these actions will have different demands. It is the responsibility of a renewed Left to support and strengthen those fights, but Leftists need to be mindful of not falling into the pitfalls of populism. The next Left must seek to make what seems impossible now possible in the future. This Left must offer analysis, suggestions, and material support with the aim of deepening those fights where possible to undermine ruling class hegemony and to nurture a liberatory hegemony.
• •   Build alternatives. In addition to participating in and supporting popular struggles, a renewed Left must engage in and support efforts to build alternative institutions and practices that could help serve as some of the building blocks of a post-capitalist society. In all of these activities we must work democratically, showing respect, accountability, tolerance, and love for the people and the planet.
• •   Engage in the Battle of Ideas. A renewed Left must ground itself in a vision of a free society. We call this vision 21st Century Socialism in an effort to signal the need to break from capitalism and to avoid repeating the errors of the 20th century socialist experiments. This vision will inform the development of a clear strategy of how to get there. The Left must also engage in the Battle of Ideas. We must present our vision of a free society in ways that connect with people’s very real frustrations with capitalist society and their ambitions for a better future. Along with the frontline struggles and alternative institutions, this work will lay the basis for a new common sense. 
• •   Forge a revolutionary social bloc. Any successful effort to challenge and build alternatives to the capitalist, racist, and sexist world order will involve millions of people around the world. The strategic alliance between the working class and communities of color form the two wings of the bloc that can lead a successful challenge to the ruling class in the United States. Building democratic organizations rooted in working class communities of color provides the greatest guarantee that the interests of these sectors is at the center of the perspectives, programs, and demands of the movement. Because their interests demand an end to the tyranny of patriarchy, white supremacy, capitalism, and imperialism, building organizations rooted in these sectors is of strategic importance. However, the Left’s attention cannot focus on these sectors exclusively. The Left must cultivate a vision, organizational fronts, and demands that forge a new identity, a new social bloc that sees its interests as being served best by an alternative to the existing tyranny of the 1%. Winning over and engaging other sectors of society — without betraying the interests of the most exploited and oppressed sectors both here in the U.S. and around the world — is one of the central strategic tasks of a renewed Left.
• •   Connect with struggles around the globe. Any liberatory movement based in the United States must recognize the imperial privilege that this country has and continues to profit from. Justice and liberation cannot be achieved at the expense of the global community. International solidarity and global equity must be a driving principle of any liberation movement. The next Left will look to build connections to social movements around the world and to link our local struggles to the efforts of other activists struggling on different terrain towards our common objectives.
    
• •  Renew our movement culture. To make such a revolutionary project possible, we need a renewed Left culture based on respect for political and ideological pluralism. This is deeply connected to the dialectical process of breaking from the alienation so pervasive in the capitalist system. As we struggle to transform society, we must also struggle to transform ourselves. This will happen through conscious work at individual and collective levels, just as it will happen through collective struggles for human solidarity as we recover parts of ourselves that have been long atrophied in an environment of consumerism and individualism.
• •   Build democratic participation and revolutionary protagonism. The capitalist democracy promoted by the U.S. empire is a hallow perversion. Democratic protagonism rejects the idea that democracy is simply about one magical moment of decision-making. Through our exposure to systems, we all learn and develop particular skills and attitudes. Social relations under capitalism undermine and diminish our capacities. On the other hand, participatory democracy takes into account all of the steps leading up to the making of the decision, thereby promoting people to be protagonists, the makers of history. As Karl Marx noted, the key to revolutionary practice is not simply being in a different circumstance, but also in helping to make that changed situation. The Next Left must take up different practices and procedures to develop everyone’s capacities so that we can all play leading roles in shaping the decisions, workplaces, communities, and world in which we live.
• •   Deepen our capacity to respond to ruptures. The first years of this decade have witnessed an unprecedented level of ecological catastrophe, social upheaval and popular mobilization. Much of this action is a direct response to social, economic, and political contradictions and the ruling class’ self-serving attempts to manage those contradictions — since it is not in their interests to fully resolve the contradictions. As long as these social, economic, and ecological contradictions continue to grow, more upsurges and mobilizations are likely to occur. The task for a renewed and reinvigorated Left will be to support and offer facilitative leadership in the midst those reactions. Individual Leftists acting independently cannot accomplish this task. Nimble and coherent, collective action of Leftists multiplies and amplifies the impact of social movements and of the Left so that crisis can be transformed into opportunity. The opportunity to begin making real our vision of a more just, equal, sustainable, and protagonistic world.

While this outline marks a particular approach to building a liberatory movement, we recognize that it is just an outline. It is not a strategy. Within this outline, there are a lot of unanswered questions: what is the class structure of U.S. society? Which classes and social groups have the power and potential to lead and participate in a historic bloc for liberatory transformation? What regions are most have the most potential to advance the struggle? What might be the role of rural-urban alliances in a liberation movement? How does the re-emergence of the racist right, the expanding role of state-sponsored infiltration and criminalization impact movement building efforts? Given the financial crises impacting state and local governments, what campaigns and targets give us the best possibility to advance? The list goes on.

Ultimately, more research and analysis will be necessary in order to ground our analysis in the real conditions and class structure of the U.S. empire, and we believe that by doing this work, we will be able to make this outline a strategic tool with goals, objectives, and criteria that can help strengthen the struggle for a free society.

LeftRoots is not acting alone to achieve these objectives. We are both a project and an organization. As a project, LeftRoots aims to work with others to help nurture the re-emergence of an ideologically sharp, tactically adept, and strategically clear Left that can help spark and be of service to massive social movements confronting and building alternatives to imperialism, capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. As an organization, LeftRoots is a political home for a grouping of social movement Leftists that we consider to be key to the re-emergence of the Next left in the United States.

BUILDING BEYOND THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT LEFT

As we’ve discussed, any successful revolutionary movement will involve conscious and organized Left forces. It is equally important that the Left include the participation and leadership of those from the very social sectors that make up the leading forces in the liberation struggle: working class people, people of color, women, queer, gender queer, and young people.

Clearly, this is not what the self-identified Left looks like right now. For the Left to be successful will require a radical shift in who sees themselves as a part of it. Though we are far from this reimagined Left, there are hundreds of Leftists out there, many of us playing key roles in social movements rooted in the popular sectors, that will play a central role if the U.S. Left is to expand its power and influence.

These Leftists who are deeply engaged in social movements must play a leading role in renewing and reshaping the Left in the United States. This will not be easy since social movement and base organizing work are relentless and can be all-consuming, but it’s necessary. Leftists in social movements are uniquely positioned to bring together the lessons and experiences from various frontline struggles to expand on old ideas and practices and innovate new ones.

Many do not see the revolutionary potential of the social movement Left. We are like bees of the movement world. Many flight experts don’t understand how bees actually fly. According to their calculations, their wings are too small to be able to carry their relatively large bodies. Undeterred by the naysayers, bees fly around and play a critical role in supporting the ecosystem. Bees cross-pollenate. They carry pollen in the same way that social movement Leftists so often cross over the silos that constrain our movement work, bringing information and lessons from one movement to another.

Bees are social creatures. They draw their strength from acting in cooperation with the other bees in their colony. One of the most dangerous impacts of the increased use of pesticides is that many of those chemicals are drugging bees to such an extent that they are not able to find their way back to their hives. Isolated and separated from their homes, bees are dying off in alarming numbers.

Due to many different reasons including the impacts of COINTELPRO, the neoliberal assault and the weakening of the global left, social movement Leftists in the United States have been trying to figure out answers on our own, hoping our efforts would add up to something more. But isolated and unable to collectivize our power and impact, we have come up against the limitations of nonprofits and the trade union movement.

LeftRoots is building a political home for social movement Leftists in the United States to come together to build a collective identity and to develop transformational strategy that can help unleash the power of the people. This, we hope will contribute to sharpening the Left edge of social movements and reinvigorating the Left in general.

Footnote: ‘Protagonism’ is a term that we first came across in the work of Marta Harnecker who noted its usage amongst social movement activists throughout Latin America. We have adopted the use of the term within LeftRoots even though there is no direct translation in English because, like no other term we’ve come across, ‘protagonism’ names an approach that has the potential to strengthen social movements inside the United States. The concept builds from the literary term ‘protagonist’ which refers to a character who takes ownership over her destiny and drives the narrative forward by taking action. In a similar vein, we understand protagonism to be the democratic engagement which builds our individual and collective capacities for transformative change and, in doing so, combats our fundamental alienation from the means of production, from the products of our labor, from each other, and from ourselves.

Occupy Wall Street protest, two days after dismantling of Zuccotti Park camp (Christopher Smith)

By Mark Engler and Paul Engler –

Dissent Magazine, September 4, 2014

Cross-posted from Waging Nonviolence.

Those who get involved in social movements share a common experience: sometimes, when an issue captures the public eye or an unexpected event triggers a wave of mass protest, there can be periods of intense activity, when new members rush to join the cause and movement energy swells. But these extraordinary times are often followed by long, fallow stretches when activists’ numbers dwindle and advocates struggle to draw any attention at all.

During these lulls, those who have tasted the euphoria of a peak moment feel discouraged and pessimistic. The ups and downs of social movements can be hard to take.

Certainly, activists fighting around issues of inequality and economic justice have seen this pattern in the wake of Occupy Wall Street. Many working to combat climate change have encountered their own periods of dejection after large protests in recent years. And even members of movements that have been very successful—such as the immigrant students who compelled the Obama administration to implement a de facto version of the Dream Act—have gone through periods of deflation despite making great advances. Further back in history, a sense of failure and frustration could be seen among civil rights activists following the landmark 1964 Freedom Summer campaign.

After intensive uprisings have cooled, many participants simply give up and move on to other pursuits. Even those committed to ongoing activism wonder how they can keep more people involved over the long haul.

Unfortunately, the fluctuating cycles of popular movements cannot be avoided. Unlike community organizing, which focuses on the slow and steady building of organizational structures, a boom-and-bust pattern is inherent in mass protest movements. Wide-scale uprisings can make a major impact on public consciousness, but they can never be sustained for long. The fact that they fade from view does not mean they lack value—the civil rights movement, for one, scored many of its biggest wins as a result of mass mobilization and the innovative use of nonviolent direct action. But it does present a challenge: Without an understanding of movement cycles, it is difficult to combat despondency.

So how, then, do we know when movements have died—and when are they primed to revive? And how do activists translate periods of peak activity into substantive and enduring social change?

For Bill Moyer, a trainer and strategist who experienced first hand some of the landmark movement cycles of the 1960s and ’70s, grappling with these questions became a life’s work. Moyer’s legacy is an eight-stage model for how movements can overcome despair and marginality to change society—a framework known as the Movement Action Plan, or MAP. Nearly three decades after it was first developed, the MAP continues to offer insights into problems that, while new to fresh generations of activists, in fact have a long lineage.

The Moyer map

Moyer was born in 1933 and grew up as the son of a TV repairman in northeast Philadelphia. As a child, he aspired to one day become a Presbyterian missionary in Africa. But a trouble-making spirit would ultimately get in the way. As he told it, “In March 1959 I was voted out of the Presbyterian Church because I invited a Catholic and a Jew to talk to the youth group.”

The expulsion led him into the arms of the Quakers. At the time, Moyer was just three years out of Penn State, working as a management systems engineer and searching for more “meaning.” Through Philadelphia’s active Quaker meetinghouse, Moyer came in contact with a vibrant circle of socially engaged peers, and an elder couple tutored him in theories of nonviolence. These encounters forever altered his life. “I had no idea that it was the start of ‘the sixties,’” Moyer later wrote, “and never suspected that I was beginning my new profession as a full-time activist.”

Without models that looked at the long arc of protest movements, Moyer contended, activists became stuck in their thinking, repeating past tactics and failing to strategize for how to effectively move their campaigns forward.

In the 1960s, Moyer would take a job with the American Friends Service Committee in Chicago, helping to convince Martin Luther King to launch an open housing campaign in the city. Moyer then worked on King’s last drive, the 1968 Poor People’s Campaign in Washington, D.C. In the decade that followed, he spent his energies protesting the Vietnam War, supporting American Indian Movement activists at Wounded Knee, and promoting the newly emerging movement against nuclear power.

As he increasingly began training other activists, Moyer saw a gap. “How-to-do-it models and manuals provide step-by-step guidelines for most human activity,” he wrote in 1987, “from baking a cake and playing tennis to having a relationship and winning a war.” Within the world of activism, however, such material was harder to come by.

Saul Alinsky and his followers had created training manuals for their specific brand of community organizing. Likewise, materials drawing from Gandhi and King were available for instructing people in how to create individual nonviolent confrontations. But Moyer believed that there was a lack of models that looked at the long arc of protest movements, materials that accounted for the highs and lows experienced by participants. The result, he contended, was that activists became stuck in their thinking, always repeating the past tactics and failing to strategize for how to effectively move their campaigns forward.

Moyer’s MAP aimed to address this need. It was initially printed in 1986 in the movement journal Dandelion, with twelve-thousand newsprint copies distributed through grassroots channels. Subsequently, it became an underground hit. The plan would continue to be circulated by hand, translated into other languages, and shared at trainings for well over a decade, before taking its final form in the 2002 book Doing Democracy, published shortly before Moyer’s death.

“Every good movement”

Of course, creating social change is a lot trickier than baking a cake. And Moyer was not the only person to propose that movements progress in stages.

Within the academic field of social movement theory, which experienced significant growth in the 1970s and ’80s, scholars were increasingly appreciating how social change happens through what sociologist Sidney Tarrow calls “cycles of contention.” Drawing on the work of theorists including Herbert Blumer and Charles Tilly, the standard academic account holds that movements pass through four stages: emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization, and decline. The last stage is not necessarily negative: movements sometimes are defeated or repressed, but other times they fade away because they have won their key demands.

Outside of academia, a variety of activists have offered thoughts of their own. In the March 9, 1921 edition of Young India, Mohandas Gandhi wrote, “Every good movement passes through five stages: indifference, ridicule, abuse, repression, and respect.” Because Gandhi’s take highlights the likelihood that resistance will be met with a crackdown by authorities, the prospect of progressing through his stages seems less inviting than riding out the academics’ model. But Gandhi believed that dissidents are strengthened by the trials they endure. “Every movement that survives repression, mild or severe, invariably commands respect,” he contended, “which is another name for success.”

In recent years British author and activist Tim Gee has gone so far to propose a four-stage model based on a popular maxim that mirrors Gandhi’s sentiment (and is often misattributed to him): “First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.”

All of these different models have some value, but they also present problems.

One problem, which Gee notes, is that various proposals for sequential stages for movements carry a sense of “implied inevitability.” The academic theories, in particular, suggest a sort of linear progression that does not reflect the experience of those living through boom-and-bust movement cycles. As removed instruments of analysis, they can leave real-world participants feeling cold. As Moyer puts it, “While there is much useful information in social movement theories, most do not help us under the ebb and flow of living, breathing social movements as they grow and change over time.”

Moyer’s MAP model is a different animal. It, too, proposes a progression through which successful movements pass: over the course of his eight stages, activists raise initial awareness of a grievance, then become more organized in their efforts, engage in confrontation, and finally work to consolidate their gains. However, Moyer is much more attuned to the psychology of those who must struggle to push a cause forward. The MAP captures of the exhilaration of times when—following a dramatic “trigger event”—protests explode and “overnight, a previously unrecognized social problem becomes a social issue that everyone is talking about.” (The Occupy encampments stand out as a prominent recent trigger, just as the 1999 protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle fit the bill for the global justice movement.) And the model grapples in detail with the often-challenging aftermath of such peak moments.

Rooted in hard-won experience, Moyer’s work is attentive to the different roles and personalities that can help or hinder an effort at any given stage in its development, and it is careful to warn of the common pitfalls that keep some movements from ever realizing their goals. These factors helped earn the MAP its cult popularity. Moyer was proud when trainers using his materials reported that participants would nearly gasp in recognition when his model explained patterns which they had thought were unique to their own experience. Moyer called these “Aha!” moments, and his goal was to create as many of them as possible.

The perception of failure

For those encountering the MAP model for the first time, the biggest “Aha” usually comes with Moyer’s stage five. The previous stage—stage four—is when protest movements take off, holding attention-grabbing demonstrations and experiencing rapid growth. But what comes next is not a smooth stroll to success. Instead, according to Moyer, the flurry of activity is followed by “Perception of Failure.”

With this stage, Moyer highlights a paradox: activists commonly feel let down after a spike in activity subsides. Yet, it is just at this moment that they may be poised to reap significant gains. Moyer writes, “After a year or two, the high hopes of instant victory in the movement take-off stage inevitably turn into despair as some activists begin to believe that their movement is failing. It has not achieved its goals and, in their eyes, it has not had any ‘real’ victories.”

At this point many people “burn out or drop out because of the exhaustion caused by overwork and long meetings.” Moreover, the mainstream media reinforces an air of negativity by reporting that, since protests have dropped off, the movement is dead and has accomplished nothing. All of this, Moyer writes, combines to create “a self-fulfilling prophecy that prevents or limits [movement] success.”

Bill Moyer’s Movement Action Plan (WagingNonviolence/Doing Democracy)

By identifying the perception of failure as a normal part of social movement cycles, Moyer hoped to blunt the negative force of this stage. He argued that activists who look to history will see that they are not alone in experiencing letdown. And they will also notice that past movements that were able to overcome despondency ended up seeing many of their once-distant demands realized. The key is to step back and prepare for the next stage—in which activists benefit from the increase of public awareness created by their past protests, and in which their proposals for alternative solutions are more likely to find receptive audiences.

Because feelings of failure within movements are so rarely acknowledged in other sources—far less considered thoughtfully—stage five invariably becomes a focal point when Moyer’s work is discussed. Waging Nonviolence editor Nathan Schneider applied the “perception of failure” in analyzing the Occupy movement on its second anniversary for The Nation. And none other than far-right guru and ex-Fox News titan Glenn Beck considered Moyer’s stage five in some detail in contemplating the future prospects of the Tea Party.

But, we might ask, are perceptions of failure necessarily irrational and misguided?

Clearly, there is a danger here. While everyone likes to be told that they are winning, blasé reassurances are no substitute for real analysis. It is possible to misinterpret Moyer’s model as a guarantee that, if you feel that your movement is faltering, you simply need to wait a little longer and things will work out. This is a comforting idea, and also a false one. The fate of some movements, Moyer acknowledges on the first page of Doing Democracy, is simply to fail miserably. Yours could be one of them.

The question, then, is: how does one determine when pessimism is misplaced—and how do you gauge genuine progress?

Hearts and minds

The answer is at once straightforward and counter-intuitive: movements succeed when they win over ever-greater levels of public support for their cause. This is a point that Moyers repeats constantly and consistently. “Social movements involve a long-term struggle between the movement and the powerholders for the hearts, minds, and support of the majority of the population,” he argues. Therefore, the job of activists is to “alert, educate, and win over an ever-increasing majority of the public.” Without a preponderance of public sympathy, a popular movement cannot prevail. “Because it is the people who ultimately hold the power,” Moyers concludes, “they will either preserve the status quo or create change.”

These proposals sound reasonable—perhaps even obvious—on their face. But in fact they present a serious challenge to the way in which most people think about political life. In conventional politics, the focus is not on winning over the majority of the public or transforming the climate of debate on an issue. Rather, negotiations take place in the realms of the possible and the expedient. Interest groups spend the great bulk of their energy pressuring power-holding elites to grant favors or make concessions. Success is measured by their ability to leverage power in order to secure incremental gains on the issues they care about. Social change, in this paradigm, comes about through the slow accumulation of these calculated, instrumental victories.

Even as they slowly accumulate popular sympathy, movements may lack any real traction in the halls of power. But once public opinion tips, the floodgates of change can open.

Moyer’s theory of change, based on the idea of winning majority support, rests on a different set of suppositions. In the MAP model, long stretches of time can pass where little seems to change. Even as they slowly accumulate popular sympathy, movements may lack any real traction in the halls of power. But once public opinion tips, the floodgates of change can open.

“Over the years… the weight of massive public opposition, along with the defection of many elites, takes its toll,” Moyer explains. Movement activists may have been told for as long as they could remember that their demands were naïve and politically impractical. But once majority support for their position is firmly established, this starts to change, sometimes abruptly. The limits of the possible can be redefined—as they were with civil rights in the 1960s, or with the call to phase out nuclear power in 1980s, or with gay marriage in recent years.

“The long-term impact of social movements,” Moyer contends in a sentence that would be heretical in conventional political circles, “is more important than their immediate material success.”

The idea of winning over majority public support creates a metric by which activists can judge where they stand in the MAP model—and this sets Moyer’s framework apart from other, more amorphous accounts of movement cycles. In the MAP’s early stages, during the initial ripening of conditions around an issue, less than 30 percent of the population might agree with a movement’s insistence that the status quo must change. As activists ramp up protest, greater segments of the public become aware of the problem at hand, and successful movements push levels of sympathy toward the 50 percent mark. Only after they pass this threshold does the endgame of a movement begin. At that point, change agents can shift their focus from demonstrating that a problem exists to advocating for alternatives—and they can start seeing these alternatives adopted in mainstream politics.

And then you win

A focus on “hearts and minds” provides the key to unraveling the mystery of stage five. When advocates for social change recognize that their core objective is winning over the public, they are equipped to judge whether or not pessimism about their progress is legitimate.

Perceptions of failure are warranted when movements alienate potential supporters. When periods of peak protest activity fizzle, there is a danger that some activists—a group Moyer calls the “negative rebels”—will resort to insular vanguardism. Focusing solely on building a radical core rather than on persuading the outside world, these actors advocate for increasing dramatic tactics that appeal to disgruntled activists’ militant sensibilities, but that hold little appeal for observers who are not already among the converted. When this happens, a movement becomes more and more marginal, and fears of irrelevance are not misplaced.

On the other hand, movements that are building popular support need not worry if their initial moment in the spotlight passes and the fickle news media turns its attention elsewhere. Although they may miss the enthusiasm and energy of the earlier period, they should not accept the notion that they have become irrelevant. As long as a movement has gained a larger share of public sympathy as a result of its efforts, its activists are well positioned to push for greater change. This push will typically involve continued public education, advocacy for movement solutions, and readiness to ignite fresh waves of protest when the opportunities arise.

Moyer tells the story of when he first presented the MAP model: in February 1978, he was set to give a presentation at a strategy conference to forty-five organizers from the Clamshell Alliance. This anti-nuclear group had conducted a landmark series of direct action protests against the Seabrook power plant in New England. At its peak, the previous spring, the alliance carried out an occupation of Seabrook in which 1,414 people were arrested and spent twelve days in jail. As Moyer writes, “During those two weeks, nuclear energy became a worldwide public issue as the mass media spotlight focused on the activists locked in armories throughout New Hampshire.”

In the wake of the Clamshell actions, hundreds of new grassroots groups formed around the country. The Seabrook protest would inspire further occupations in places such as the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant in California. Moreover, the organization’s methods—its affinity groups, spokes councils, consensus process, and focus on militant, nonviolent blockades—would ultimately become an influential model for direct action in the United States.

Because of all they had accomplished, Moyer expected that the group at the conference would be upbeat and celebratory. Instead, he encountered something quite different. “I was shocked when the Clamshell activists arrived with heads bowed, dispirited and depressed, saying their efforts had been in vain,” Moyer writes. Because protests had died down and construction on the specific plant they had targeted still continued, they felt defeated.

In his presentation—a sketchy version of what would become his eight stages of social movements—Moyer scrambled to demonstrate how the activists had made considerable gains. By galvanizing national opposition to the industry, the movement already reversed the near-universal acceptance of nuclear power that prevailed during the 1960s and early ’70s. Activists were well on there way to establishing majority support for their position—and seeing tangible changes as a result.

Moyer believes that the framework he presented helped many of the activists to better understand their predicament and plan for future stages of activity. Whether or not this is the case, anti-nuclear campaigns ultimately achieved a resounding victory. By making the safety, cost, and ecological impact of nuclear power into concerns shared by a majority of Americans, they created a situation in which orders for new nuclear power plants ceased, the government was forced to abandon its goal of having 1,000 facilities in operation by the end of the millennium, and the number of working plants was set on a path of steady decline—a path on which it continues to this day.

Among the majority

Social movement activists are notoriously poor at celebrating their victories. Stage five is not the only point in Moyer’s model when they are often inclined toward despair. Ironically, near the end of MAP’s eight stages, when movements begin to see concrete wins, it is again common to see participants experience depression. At this point, with a firm majority of the population in support of an issue, opportunists flourish. Mainstream politicians, centrist organizations, former critics, and once-recalcitrant power brokers all scramble to take credit for gains that have been achieved. Notwithstanding years of stonewalling, silence, and timidity, these people insist they, too, are repulsed by segregation; that they are truly committed to environmental protections; that they strongly believe in marriage equality; and that the war they once had endorsed was actually the mistaken folly of their political opponents.

Often, movements receive scant credit for bringing about such changes of heart. Those who have done the most are likely to be missing from the victory parties, and they are also the most likely to have a pained awareness of the work that still remains to be done.

Yet activists who were pioneers in highlighting the injustice of an issue—and who may well have felt themselves failures at many points along the road—can take pleasure in seeing society come to regard their once-incendiary views as little more than common sense. These one-time rebels may no longer stand out as much as they did when they were marginal and embattled. But from the new majority they helped create, they can command at least a small measure of begrudging respect. Which is another name for success.

Students in Milan took to the streets to protest against Italian austerity, October, 4 2013. (Photo via Shutterstock)

Reality always has this power to surprise. It surprises you with an answer that it gives to questions never asked – and which are most tempting. A great stimulus to life is there, in the capacity to divine possible unasked questions.

— Eduardo Galeano

By Henry Giroux

Truthout, July 2, 2014

Neoliberalism’s Assault on Democracy

Fred Jameson has argued that “that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” He goes on to say that “We can now revise that and witness the attempt to imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world” (Jameson 2003).

One way of understanding Jameson’s comment is that within the ideological and affective spaces in which the neoliberal subject is produced and market-driven ideologies are normalized, there are new waves of resistance, especially among young people, who are insisting that casino capitalism is driven by a kind of mad violence and form of self-sabotage, and that if it does not come to an end, what we will experience, in all probability, is the destruction of human life and the planet itself.

Certainly, more recent scientific reports on the threat of ecological disaster from researchers at the University of Washington, NASA, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reinforce this dystopian possibility. [1]

As the latest stage of predatory capitalism, neoliberalism is part of a broader economic and political project of restoring class power and consolidating the rapid concentration of capital, particularly financial capital (Giroux 2008; 2014). As a political project, it includes “the deregulation of finance, privatization of public services, elimination and curtailment of social welfare programs, open attacks on unions, and routine violations of labor laws” (Yates 2013). As an ideology, it casts all dimensions of life in terms of market rationality, construes profit-making as the arbiter and essence of democracy, consuming as the only operable form of citizenship, and upholds the irrational belief that the market can both solve all problems and serve as a model for structuring all social relations. As a mode of governance, it produces identities, subjects, and ways of life driven by a survival-of-the fittest ethic, grounded in the idea of the free, possessive individual, and committed to the right of ruling groups and institutions to exercise power removed from matters of ethics and social costs. As a policy and political project, it is wedded to the privatization of public services, the dismantling of the connection of private issues and public problems, the selling off of state functions, liberalization of trade in goods and capital investment, the eradication of government regulation of financial institutions and corporations, the destruction of the welfare state and unions, and the endless marketization and commodification of society.

Neoliberalism has put an enormous effort into creating a commanding cultural apparatus and public pedagogy in which individuals can only view themselves as consumers, embrace freedom as the right to participate in the market, and supplant issues of social responsibility for an unchecked embrace of individualism and the belief that all social relation be judged according to how they further one’s individual needs and self-interests. Matters of mutual caring, respect, and compassion for the other have given way to the limiting orbits of privatization and unrestrained self-interest, just as it has become increasingly difficult to translate private troubles into larger social, economic, and political considerations. As the democratic public spheres of civil society have atrophied under the onslaught of neoliberal regimes of austerity, the social contract has been either greatly weakened or replaced by savage forms of casino capitalism, a culture of fear, and the increasing use of state violence. One consequence is that it has become more difficult for people to debate and question neoliberal hegemony and the widespread misery it produces for young people, the poor, middle class, workers, and other segments of society — now considered disposable under neoliberal regimes which are governed by a survival-of-the fittest ethos, largely imposed by the ruling economic and political elite. That they are unable to make their voices heard and lack any viable representation in the process makes clear the degree to which young people and others are suffering under a democratic deficit, producing what Chantal Mouffe calls “a profound dissatisfaction with a number of existing societies” under the reign of neoliberal capitalism (Mouffe 2013:119). This is one reason why so many youth, along with workers, the unemployed, and students, have been taking to the streets in Greece, Mexico, Egypt, the United States, and England.

The Rise of Disposable Youth

What is particularly distinctive about the current historical conjuncture is the way in which young people, particularly low-income and poor minority youth across the globe, have been increasingly denied any place in an already weakened social order and the degree to which they are no longer seen as central to how a number of countries across the globe define their future.

The plight of youth as disposable populations is evident in the fact that millions of them in countries such as England, Greece, and the United States have been unemployed and denied long term benefits. The unemployment rate for young people in many countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece hovers between 40 and 50 per cent. To make matters worse, those with college degrees either cannot find work or are working at low-skill jobs that pay paltry wages. In the United States, young adjunct faculty constitute one of the fastest growing populations on food stamps. Suffering under huge debts, a jobs crisis, state violence, a growing surveillance state, and the prospect that they would inherit a standard of living far below that enjoyed by their parents, many young people have exhibited a rage that seems to deepen their resignation, despair, and withdrawal from the political arena.

This is the first generation, as sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argues, in which the “plight of the outcast may stretch to embrace a whole generation.” (Bauman 2012a; 2012b; 2012c) He rightly insists that today’s youth have been “cast in a condition of liminal drift, with no way of knowing whether it is transitory or permanent” (Bauman 2004:76). Youth no longer occupy the hope of a privileged place that was offered to previous generations. They now inhabit a neoliberal notion of temporality marked by a loss of faith in progress along with the emergence of apocalyptic narratives in which the future appears indeterminate, bleak, and insecure. Heightened expectations and progressive visions pale and are smashed next to the normalization of market-driven government policies that wipe out pensions, eliminate quality health care, raise college tuition, and produce a harsh world of joblessness, while giving millions to banks and the military. Students, in particular, found themselves in a world in which unrealized aspirations have been replaced by dashed hopes and a world of onerous debt (Fraser 2013; On the history of debt, see Graeber 2012).

The Revival of the Radical Imagination

Within the various regimes of neoliberalism that have emerged particularly in North since the late 1970s, the ethical grammars that drew attention to the violence and suffering withered or, as in the United States, seemed to disappear altogether, while dispossessed youth continued to lose their dignity, bodies, and material goods to the machineries of disposability. The fear of losing everything, the horror of an engulfing and crippling precarity, the quest to merely survive, the rise of the punishing state and police violence, along with the impending reality of social and civil death, became a way of life for the 99 percent in the United States and other countries. Under such circumstances, youth were no longer the place where society reveals its dreams, but increasingly hid its nightmares. Against the ravaging policies of austerity and disposability, “zones of abandonment appeared in which the domestic machinery of violence, suffering, cruelty, and punishment replaced the values of compassion, social responsibility, and civic courage” (Biehl 2005:2).

In opposition to such conditions, a belief in the power of collective resistance and politics emerged once again in 2010, as global youth protests embraced the possibility of deepening and expanding democracy, rather than rejecting it. Such movements produced a new understanding of politics based on horizontal forms of collaboration and political participation. In doing so, they resurrected revitalized and much needed questions about class power, inequality, financial corruption, and the shredding of the democratic process. They also explored as well as what it meant to create new communities of mutual support, democratic modes of exchange and governance, and public spheres in which critical dialogue and exchanges could take place (For an excellent analysis on neoliberal-induced financial corruption, see Anderson 2004).

A wave of youth protests starting in 2010 in Tunisia, and spreading across the globe to the United States and Europe, eventually posed a direct challenge to neoliberal modes of domination and the corruption of politics, if not democracy itself (Hardt & Negri 2012). The legitimating, debilitating, and depoliticizing notion that politics could only be challenged within established methods of reform and existing relations of power was rejected outright by students and other young people across the globe. For a couple of years, young people transformed basic assumptions about what politics is and how the radical imagination could be mobilized to challenge the basic beliefs of neoliberalism and other modes of authoritarianism. They also challenged dominant discourses ranging from deficit reduction and taxing the poor to important issues that included poverty, joblessness, the growing unmanageable levels of student debt, and the massive spread of corporate corruption. As Jonathan Schell argued, youth across the globe were enormously successfully in unleashing “a new spirit of action”, an expression of outrage fueled less by policy demands than by a cry of collective moral and political indignation whose message was

‘Enough!’ to a corrupt political, economic and media establishment that hijacked the world’s wealth for itself… sabotaging the rule of law, waging interminable savage and futile wars, plundering the world’s finite resources, and lying about all this to the public [while] threatening Earth’s life forms into the bargain. (Schell 2011)

Yet, some theorists have recently argued that little has changed since 2011, in spite of this expression of collective rage and accompanying demonstrations by youth groups across the globe.

The Collapse or Reconfiguration of Youthful Protests?

Costas Lapavitsas and Alex Politaki, writing in The Guardian, argue that as the “economic and social disaster unfolded in 2012 and 2013”, youth in Greece, France, Portugal, and Spain have largely been absent from “politics, social movements and even from the spontaneous social networks that have dealt with the worst of the catastrophe” (Lapavitsas & Politaki 2014). Yet, at the same time, they insist that more and more young people have been “attracted to nihilistic ends of the political spectrum, including varieties of anarchism and fascism” (Lapavitsas & Politaki 2014). This indicates that young people have hardly been absent from politics. On the contrary, those youth moving to the right are being mobilized around needs that simply promise the swindle of fulfillment. This does not suggest youth are becoming invisible. On the contrary, the move on the part of students and others to the right implies that the economic crisis has not been matched by a crisis of ideas, one that would propel young people towards left political parties or social formations that effectively articulate a critical understanding of the present economic and political crisis.  Missing here is also a strategy to create and sustain a radical democratic political movement that avoids cooptation of the prevailing economic and political systems of oppression now dominating the United States, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, France, and England, among other countries.

This critique of youthful protesters as a suspect generation is repeated in greater detail by Andrew R. Myers in Student Pulse (Myers 2012). He argues that deteriorating economic and educational conditions for youth all over Europe have created not only a profound sense of political pessimism among young people, but also a dangerous, if not cynical, distrust towards established politics. Regrettably, Myers seems less concerned about the conditions that have written young people out of jobs, a decent education, imposed a massive debt on them, and offers up a future of despair and dashed hopes than the alleged unfortunate willingness of young people to turn their back on traditional parties. Myers argues rightly that globalization is the enemy of young people and is undermining democracy, but he wrongly insists that traditional social democratic parties are the only vehicles and hope left for real reform. As such, Myers argues that youth who exhibit distrust towards established governments and call for the construction of another world symbolize political defeat, if not cynicism itself. Unfortunately, with his lament about how little youth are protesting today and about their lack of engagement in the traditional forms of politics, he endorses, in the end, a defense of those left/liberal parties that embrace social democracy and the new labor policies of centrist-left coalitions. His rebuke borders on bad faith, given his criticism of young people for not engaging in electoral politics and joining with unions, both of which, for many youth, rightfully represent elements of a reformist politics they reject.

It is ironic that both of these critiques of the alleged passivity of youth and the failure of their politics have nothing to say about the generations of adults that failed these young people — that is, what disappears in these narratives is the fact that an older generation accepted the “realization that one generation no longer holds out a hand to the next” (Knott 2011:ix). What is lacking here is any critical sense regarding the historical conditions and dismal lack of political and moral responsibility of an adult generation who shamefully bought into and reproduced, at least since the 1970s, governments and social orders wedded to war, greed, political corruption, xenophobia, and willing acceptance of the dictates of a ruthless form of neoliberal globalization.

In fact, what was distinctive about the protesting youth across the globe was their rejection to the injustices of neoliberalism and their attempts to redefine the meaning of politics and democracy, while fashioning new forms of revolt (Hardt & Negri 2012; Graeber 2013). Among their many criticisms, youthful protesters argued vehemently that traditional social democratic, left, and liberal parties suffered from an “extremism of the center” that made them complicitous with the corporate and ruling political elites, resulting in their embrace of the inequities of a form of casino capitalism which assumed that the market should govern the entirety of social life, not just the economic realm (Hardt & Negri 2012:88).

Resurrecting the Radical Imagination

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued that what united the Occupy Movement in the US with other movements globally was their emphasis on direct action and their rejection of modernist structures of representation and politics, including support for elections and traditional political parties, which they considered corrupt. As such, they did not reject the project of democracy, but asked where it had gone and how they could “engage with it again” and win back “the political power of the citizen worker” (Hardt & Negri 2012:29). Commenting on the radical nature of such youth protests, David Graeber argues that the potential of the new youth movements, if not their threat to both conservatives and liberals alike, is that they were more “willing to embrace positions more radical than anything seen, on a mass scale” in a number of countries, particularly “their explicit appeal to class politics, a complete reconstruction of the existing political system, [and] a call (for many at least) not just to reform capitalism but to begin dismantling it entirely” (Graeber 2013:69-70).

What recent critics of the current state of  youth protests miss is that the real issue is not whether the occupy movements throughout Europe and the US have petered out, but rather, what have we learned from them, how have they been transformed, and what are we going to do about it? More specifically, what can be done to revitalize these rebellions into an international movement capable of effecting real change? Rather than claiming that youth have failed protesting the politics of austerity, neoliberal economies of stagnation, and the corrupt rule of finance capital, it is more important to recognize the ways in which such actions are undermined by the continued struggle for survival, and the threat and reality of state violence. The great “crime” of the youthful protesters is that they have embraced the utopian notion that there is an alternative to capitalism and, in doing so, are fighting back against a systemic war on the radical imagination, the belief that everything is for consumption, and that the only value that matters is exchange value.

The protesters in various countries have not failed. On the contrary, they realize that they need more time to fully develop the visions, strategies, cultural apparatuses, infrastructures, organizations, and alliances necessary to more fully realize their attempts to replace the older, corrupt social orders with new ones that are not simply democratic, but have the support of the people who inhabit them. Rather than disappearing, many protesters have focused on more specific struggles, such as getting universities to disinvest in coal industries, fighting the rise of student debt, organizing against the Trans-Pacific Partnership, protesting austerity cuts, creating free social services for the poor and excluded, and developing educational spaces that can provide the formative culture necessary for creating the needs, identities, and modes of agency capable of democratic relations (Zeese 2013; Taaffe 2013; Brahinsky 2014). At the same time, they are participating in everyday struggles that, as Thomas Piketty points out in Capital in the Twenty-First Century, make clear that free-market capitalism is not only responsible for “terrifying” inequalities in both wealth and income, but also produces anti-democratic oligarchies (Piketty 2014:571). And it is precisely through various attempts to create spaces in which democratic culture can be cultivated that the radical imagination can be liberated from the machinery of social and political death produced by casino capitalism. What was once considered impossible becomes possible through the development of worldwide youth protests that speak to a future that is being imagined, but waiting to be brought to fruition.

Challenges for Dark Times

New rights, demands, visions, and modes of political representation dedicated to the public and social good need time and involve long-term commitments to develop. How the construction of alternative forms of power, strategies, and organization will be developed that can both challenge established powers and become more fully realized is not clear. Needless to say, while youth movements around the globe have and are providing what Hardt and Negri call “a scaffolding” in preparation for an unforeseen event that would provide the ground  for a radical social break out of which a new society can be built, there is much to be done in preparation for such an event (Hardt & Negri:103). The challenge young protesters face centers on developing visions, tactics, and strong organizations that enable strategies for change that become more than ephemeral protests reduced to “signs without organization”, incapable of making a real difference (Aronowitz 2014).

Youth in various countries need to cultivate a radical imagination capable of providing alternatives to capitalism that will offer a challenge not only to neoliberalism and its destructive austerity policies, but also a vision that speaks to people’s needs for a radical democracy, one that is capable of convincing diverse elements of a broader public that change is possible, and that existing systems of globalization and casino capitalism can be overcome. While the crisis of financial capital, among other dominant modes of oppression, must be challenged, there is also the urgent need for youth protesters to articulate “the broader dimensions of alienation beyond income disparity” (Aronowitz 2011). Issues of existential despair, meaninglessness, hopelessness, and a retreat into the orbits of privatization must be addressed if subjectivities and modes of agency are to be mobilized, capable of engaging in the long struggle for a radical democracy. Moreover, as long as these protest groups are fragmented, no significant change will take place. Planning effective strategies and building sustainable organizations will not work as long as there are divisions around authority, race, gender, class, sexuality, and identity. When these divisions function so as to democratize all demands and fail to provide some of democratic leadership, politics dissolves into a jumble of competing discourses and power becomes pathologized. As Sarah Jaffe points out,

The paradox of Occupy is that many of the things that made it succeed also made it splinter. The attraction to a “leaderless” movement was palpable, and the lack of demands made it possible for anyone to join in as long as they agreed with the basic premise that a tiny elite has too much power. Yet the idea of leaderlessness, as so many have written, masks the ways power continues to operate, and the lack of demands wound up as a refusal, oftentimes, to deal at all with existing systems. (Jaffe 2014)

Alliances among different groups, especially with workers and labor unions, must take place across national boundaries, motivated by a comprehensive understanding of global politics and its mechanics of power, ideology, corporate sovereignty, and its devastating effects on people’s lives, and the reality and ideal of a radical democracy and more just world. The possibility for such alliances, unity, and comprehensive understanding of politics among the youth of the world is greater than ever before, given the new technologies and the growing consciousness that power is now global and has generated a need for new modes of politics (Epstein 2014:41-44; Aronowitz 2014a; Aronowitz 2014b). It is time for authentic rage to transform itself into an international movement for the creation of a genuinely democratic formative culture and an effective strategy for social, political, and economic change.

Notes:

[1] See, for instance, the 5th Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. See also, the Obama Administration’s publication of the third US National Climate Assessment, which provides a comprehensive and dire scientific assessment of generated of climate change, focusing on its effects on the US economy, as well as on various regions across the United States.

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This piece was reprinted by Truthout with permission or license. It may not be reproduced in any form without permission or license from the source.

Henry A. Giroux

Henry A. Giroux currently holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University. His most recent books include: Youth in Revolt: Reclaiming a Democratic Future (Paradigm 2013), America’s Educational Deficit and the War on Youth (Monthly Review Press, 2013) Neoliberalism’s War on Higher Education (Haymarket Press, 2014), and The Violence of Organized Forgetting: Thinking Beyond America’s Disimagination Machine (City Lights, 2014). The Toronto Star named Henry Giroux one of the twelve Canadians changing the way we think! Giroux is also a member of Truthout’s Board of Directors. His web site is www.henryagiroux.com.

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